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ABSTRACT




We study sequential decision making problems in cooperative systems where different
agents with different information want to achieve a common objective. The sequen-
tial nature of the decision problem implies that all decisions can be arranged in a
sequence such that the information available to make the tth decision only depends
on preceding decisions. Markov decision theory provides tools for addressing sequen-
tial decision making problems with classical information structures. In this thesis,
we introduce a new approach for decision making problems with non-classical infor-
mation structures. This approach relies on the idea of common information between
decision-makers. Intuitively, common information consists of past observations and
decisions that are commonly known to the current and future decision makers. We
show that a common information based approach can allow us to discover new struc-
tural results of optimal decision strategies and provide a sequential decomposition of
the decision-making problems. We first demonstrate this approach on two specific
instances of sequential problems, namely, a real-time multi-terminal communication
system and a decentralized control system with delayed sharing of information. We
then show that the common information methodology applies more generally to any
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sequential decision making problem. Moreover, we show that our common infor-
mation methodology unifies the separate sequential decomposition results available
for classical and non-classical information structures. We also present sufficient con-
ditions for simplifying common information based sequential decompositions. This
simplification relies on the concept of state sufficient for the input output map of a




Decentralized systems are ubiquitous in the modern technological world. Com-
munication systems like the Internet and wireless networks, information-gathering
systems like sensor networks and surveillance networks, spatially distributed systems
like power generation and transmission systems, transportation networks, and net-
worked control systems are all examples of decentralized systems. Such systems are
characterized by the presence of multiple agents/decision-makers that may observe
their environment, communicate with each other and make decisions that affect the
overall system. Two salient features of such systems are:
1. Decentralization of Information: Different agents have different information
about the system.
2. Decentralization of Decision-Making: Multiple agents have to make decisions
in the absence of a centralized decision-making authority.
The main focus of this thesis is to investigate the relationships between the above
two features of decentralized systems: how does decentralization of information affect
decision-making by different agents?. An agent uses the information it has to make
decisions according to a decision rule/decision strategy. Thus, a decision rule/decision
strategy is a mapping from an agent’s information to its decisions. A decision strategy
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profile is a collection of decision rules/decision strategies for all the decision-makers.
The goal of this thesis is to characterize optimal decision strategy profiles in some
specific instances of decentralized systems as well as to develop general methodologies
for finding optimal decision strategy profiles. In this thesis, we focus on decentralized
decision-making problems that are:
• Cooperative: We consider decentralized decision-making problems where dif-
ferent decision-makers share the same objective. Such problems are called Team
Problems (Radner (1962), Marschak and Radner (1972), Y. C. Ho (1980), Ho
and Chu (1972), Ho et al. (1978) etc.) In contrast, Game Theory deals with
decision-making problems where different decision makers may have different
objectives.
• Stochastic: We consider decision-making problems where the decision-making
environment includes uncertain inputs. We assume stochastic models of uncer-
tainties about the decision-making environment. The presence of uncertainty
implies that under any choice of decision strategy profile, the value of the ob-
jective is a random variable. In this thesis, we seek to find strategy profiles that
maximize the expected value of the objective.
• Sequential: We consider decision-making problems where the decision-makers
act in a pre-determined order that is independent of events in the nature or the
decision strategy profile. Further, the information available to make a decision
does not depend on the decisions to be made in the future.
1.1 Information Structures and Optimization Approaches
A key concept in decision-making problems is the concept of Information Struc-
ture. Information structure of a decision-making problem describes what information
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is available to each decision-maker. In sequential decision-making problems, informa-
tion structures can be classified as classical or non-classical. In classical information
structures, a decision-maker knows all the information available to all agents that
acted before it. When an information structure does not satisfy this condition, it
is called non-classical. Markov decision theory provides a systematic way of solv-
ing sequential decision-making problems with classical information structure [Kumar
and Varaiya (1986a)]. This theory allows us to decompose the problem of finding
optimal strategies into several smaller problems which must be solved sequentially
backwards in time to obtain the optimal strategies. We refer to this simplification
as sequential decomposition of the problem. For classical information structures,
the sequential decomposition has the additional property that for each sub-problem
optimal decisions for a decision-maker can be found separately for each realization of
its information.
In this thesis, we will focus on sequential decision-making problems with non-
classical information structures. Two different conceptual approaches have been used
for such decision-making problems:
1. Agent-by-Agent Approach: In some decision-making problems, while the overall
problem has a non-classical information structure, it is possible that when the
strategies of all except one agent are fixed, then that agent’s decision-making
problem has a classical information structure. Consider such a problem where
strategies of all agents except Agent 1 are fixed and the resulting decision prob-
lem for Agent 1 has a classical information structure. Then, for the fixed choice
of other agents’ strategies, we can find an optimal strategy for Agent 1 using
ideas from Markov decision theory. If such an optimal strategy has qualitative
features or structural properties that are independent of the choice of strategies
of other agents, then we can conclude that such qualitative features or structural
properties are true for a globally optimal strategy of Agent 1. Such an approach
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to find structural results of globally optimal strategies has been used in Walrand
and Varaiya (1983a), Walrand and Varaiya (1983b), Teneketzis (2006) etc.
2. Designer’ Approach: The philosophy of this approach is to consider the opti-
mization problem of a designer who has to select a sequence of decision rules.
The designer sequentially decides a decision rule for each time. The designer’s
problem can be thought of as a problem with (trivially) classical information
structure. This approach can be used to decompose the designer’s problem of
choosing a sequence of decision rules into several sub-problems that must be
solved sequentially backwards in time. In each of these sub-problems, the de-
signer has to optimize over one decision rule (instead of the whole sequence).
Such an approach for finding a sequential decomposition of the problem of find-
ing optimal strategies has been described in detail in Witsenhausen (1973) and
Mahajan (2008).
In this thesis, we introduce a new approach for addressing sequential decision
making problems with non-classical information structures. Our new approach relies
on the idea of common information among decision-makers. Intuitively, common
information consists of past observations and decisions that are commonly known to
the current and future decision makers. We show that decision makers can use the
common information to coordinate how they make decisions. Such a coordination
approach can allow us to:
1. Find structural results of optimal decision strategies that cannot be identified
by the agent-by-agent approach.
2. Provide a sequential decomposition of the decision-making problem that is dis-
tinct from (and often simpler than) the decomposition obtained by the designer’s
approach.
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1.2 Structural Results Using Common Information
In this thesis, we consider two specific sequential decision-making problems with
non-classical information structures. In both these problems, we use the idea of
common information to find structural results for optimal decision strategies.
1.2.1 Delayed Sharing Information Structure in Decentralized Control
An interesting special case of non-classical information structures is the delayed
sharing information structure. This information structure consists of K controllers
that at each time make a private observation of the controlled system and take an
action that affects the evolution of the control system as well as the control objective.
While each controller perfectly remembers its own observation and actions of the
past, it has access to only a delayed version of other controller’s observation and action
history. In a system with n-step delayed sharing, at each time t, every controller knows
prior observations and control actions of all other controllers up to time t− n. This
information structure was proposed in Witsenhausen (1971). Witsenhausen asserted
a structural result for optimal control laws for this model without any proof.Varaiya
and Walrand (1978) proved that Witsenhausen’s assertion was true for n = 1 but
false for n > 1.
In this thesis, we resolve Witsenhausen’s conjecture; we prove two structural re-
sults of the optimal control laws for the delayed sharing information structure. Our
structural results critically rely on the observation that at any time t, the controllers
have some information that is known to all controllers at that time. We call this the
common information at time t. A central idea in our proofs is that when this com-
mon information is increasing with time (as it is in the delayed sharing information
structure), the controllers can use this common information to coordinate how they
use their private information to choose their control action. This approach allows
us to view the control problem from the perspective of a coordinator who knows the
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common information and who has to provide prescriptions to each controller on how
to use their private information. Since the common information keeps increasing with
time, the coordinator’s problem then becomes a problem with classical information
structure.
In order to address the coordinator’s problem, we identify a state sufficient for
input-output mapping of the controlled system from the coordinator’s perspective.
This allows us to describe the coordinator’s problem as the problem of controlling
the evolution of a Markov chain by means of the prescriptions that the coordina-
tor provides to the controllers. Using Markov decision theory [Kumar and Varaiya
(1986a)] allows to find structural results as well as a sequential decomposition for
finding optimal strategy for the coordinator. These results can then be carried over
to structural results and sequential decomposition for finding optimal strategies for
each controller.
1.2.2 A Real-Time Multi-Terminal Communication System
The second instance of a problem where common information can be used to
find structural results for optimal decision strategies is a real-time multi-terminal
communication system with two encoders communicating with a single receiver. The
two encoders make distinct partial observations of a Markov source. Each encoder
must encode its observations into a sequence of discrete symbols. The symbols are
transmitted over noisy/noiseless channels to a receiver that attempts to reconstruct
some function of the state of the Markov source. Real-time constraint implies that at
each time, the receiver must produce an estimate of the current state of the Markov
source. We view this problem as a sequential decision-making problem with the
encoders and receivers as the decision-makers. We first obtain structural results
of optimal strategies of encoders and receivers using an agent-by-agent approach.
We then show that our common information approach can be used to improve the
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structural results found by the agent-by-agent approach.
1.3 Common Information and General Sequential Problems
As mentioned above, our results for delayed sharing information structures and the
real-time multi-terminal communication system rely crucially on using the concept of
common information as the basis for coordination among decision-makers. A natural
question then is the following: What is the most general class of decision-making
problems where the concept of common information can be used to find a structural
results of optimal decision strategies and/or sequential decomposition of the problem
of finding optimal decision strategies? In Chapter IV, we show that one can em-
ploy a common information based methodology to find a sequential decomposition
of the problem of finding optimal decision strategies in any sequential decision-
making problem with finite spaces of observation and decisions and finite number
of decisions.
Witsenhausen (1973) showed that any sequential decision-making problem (with
finite number of decisions) can be converted into a standard form and provided a
sequential decomposition of any problem in standard form; thereby providing a a
sequential decomposition of any sequential decision-making problem. To the best of
our knowledge, our result in Chapter IV is the only other methodology to provide a
sequential decomposition for any sequential decision-making problem. In general, our
sequential decomposition differs from that of Witsehnausen’s because of its depen-
dence on common information. Our sequential decomposition coincides with Wit-
senhausen’s only in problems where common information is absent. Further, our
sequential decomposition specializes to the classical dynamic program if the decision-
making problem has a classical information structure.
In addition to the concept of common information, our result in delayed sharing
information structures relies on the identification of a state sufficient for input-output
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map of the system from the coordinator’s point of view. In Chapter V, we investigate
if such a state can be found for general sequential decision-making problems. In broad
terms, such a state should be a summary of past data that is sufficient for an input-
output description of the system from the coordinator’s point of view. Although
we do not have a algorithmic way of identifying such a state, we present sufficient
conditions for a function of past data to be a state sufficient for the coordinator’s
input output map and provide a simplified sequential decomposition when such a
state can be found.
1.4 Computational Aspects
The sequential decompositions that we find in the delayed sharing information
structures in Chapter III and for general sequential problems in V are both similar to
dynamic programs for partially observable Markov decision problems (POMDPs). As
in POMDPs, our sequential decompositions involve value functions that are functions
defined on the continuous space of probability measures on a finite state. Also, each
step of sequential decomposition requires the maximization over a finite set. One can
further show that value functions in our sequential decompositions are piecewise linear
and convex/concave. Such characterization of value functions as piecewise linear
and concave is utilized to find computationally efficient algorithms for POMDPs.
Because of the similarity of our sequential decomposition with the dynamic programs
of POMDPS, such algorithmic solutions to general POMDPs can be employed for
sequential decompositions as well. Thus, our results provide a conceptual link between
sequential decision-making problems with non-classical information structures and
algorithmic solutions of POMDPs.
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1.5 Contribution of the Thesis
The main contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
1. We demonstrate the use of common information in finding structural results of
optimal decision strategies in problems from real-time communication as well as
decentralized control. In particular, our structural results for delayed sharing
information structures resolve a long-standing open problem in decentralized
control.
2. We show that the concept of common information can be used to find a sequen-
tial decomposition of the problem of finding optimal decision strategies in any
sequential decision-making problem with finite spaces of observation and deci-
sions and finite number of decisions. This result unifies the dynamic program-
ming results of classical information structures and Witsenhausen’s sequential
decomposition of general sequential problems.
3. We identify sufficient conditions for identifying a state sufficient for input-output
map from the perspective of a coordinator that knows the common information
and selects prescriptions for decision-makers. We show that the existence of
such a state allows us to find a simplified sequential decomposition in a general
sequential decision-making problem.
4. Finally, our results establish a conceptual link between sequential decision-
making problems with non-classical information structures and algorithmic solu-
tions of Partially Observable Markov decision problems. We believe this will be
crucial in finding algorithmic solutions of decision problems with non-classical
information structures.
9
1.6 Organization of the Thesis
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter II, we investigate a real-time multi-
terminal communication problem as a decision-making problem and find structural
results for optimal decision strategies for the encoders and the receiver. In Chapter
III, we provide structural results and sequential decomposition for delayed sharing in-
formation structures. In Chapter IV, we consider a general sequential decision-making
problem and finds a sequential decomposition based on common information. We also
show the relationship of our decomposition with the classical dynamic program and
Witsenhausen’s sequential decomposition. In Chapter V, we provide conditions for
finding simpler sequential decompositions in a general sequential problem by using
the ideas of common information and a state sufficient for input-output map. We
conclude in Chapter VI.
1.7 Notation
Random variables are denoted by upper case letters; their realization by the
corresponding lower case letter. For function valued random variables, a tilde ( ˜
) denotes their realization (for example, γ˜kt ). Xa:b is a short hand for the vector
(Xa, Xa+1, . . . , Xb) while X
c:d is a short hand for the vector (Xc, Xc+1, . . . , Xd). The
combined notation Xc:da:b is a short hand for the vector (X
j
i : i = a, a + 1, . . . , b,
j = c, c+ 1, . . . , d). E denotes the expectation operator.
For two random variables X and Y taking values in X and Y , P(X = x|Y )
denotes the conditional probability of the event {X = x} given Y and P(X|Y )
denotes the conditional PMF (probability mass function) of X given Y , that is,
it denotes the collection of conditional probabilities {P(X = x|Y ), x ∈ X}. Note
that P(X = x|Y ) (resp. P(X|Y )) are random variables (resp. random vectors) with
realizations P(X = x|Y = y) (resp. P(X|Y = y)), y ∈ Y . Finally, all equalities
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involving conditional probabilities or conditional expectations are to be interpreted
as almost sure equalities (that is, they hold with probability one).
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CHAPTER II
A Multi-Terminal Communication System
2.1 Introduction
A large variety of decentralized systems require communication between various
devices or agents. In general, since such systems may have multiple senders and re-
ceivers of information, the models of point-to-point communication are not sufficient.
Further, in many decentralized systems, the purpose of communication is to achieve
a higher system objective. Examples include networked control systems where the
overall objective of communication between various sensors and controllers is to con-
trol the plant in order to achieve a performance objective, or sensor networks where
the goal of communication between sensors and a fusion center may be to quickly
estimate a physical variable or to track in real-time the evolution of a physical phe-
nomenon. In such systems, agents (sensors, controllers etc.) have to make decisions
that affect the overall system performance based only on information they currently
have gathered from the environment or from other agents through the underlying
communication system. The communication problem therefore should not only ad-
dress what information can be made available to each agent but also when is this
information available. Thus, the overall system objectives may impose constraints on
the time delay associated with communication.
In the presence of strict delay constraints on information transmission, the commu-
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nication problem becomes drastically different from the classical information-theoretic
formulations. Information theory deals with encoding and decoding of long sequences
which inevitably results in large undesirable delays. For systems with fixed (and typ-
ically small) delay requirements, the ideas of asymptotic typicality can not be used.
Moreover, information-theoretic bounds on the trade-off between delay and reliability
are only asymptotically tight and are of limited value for short sequences (Gallager
(1968)).
In this chapter we address some issues in multi-terminal communication systems
under the real-time constraint. Specifically, we look at problems with multiple senders
(encoders) communicating with a single receiver (decoder). We analyze systems with
two encoders, although our results generalize to n encoders (n > 2) and a single re-
ceiver. The two encoders make distinct partial observations of a discrete-time Markov
source. Each encoder must encode in real-time its observations into a sequence of
discrete variables that are transmitted over separate noisy channels to a common re-
ceiver. The receiver must estimate, in real-time, a given function of the state of the
Markov source. The main feature of this multi-terminal problem that distinguishes it
from a point to point communication problem is the presence of coupling between the
encoders (that is, each encoder must take into account what other encoder is doing).
This coupling arises because of the following reasons : 1) The encoders’ observations
are correlated with each other. 2) The encoding problems are further coupled be-
cause the receiver wants to minimize a non-separable distortion metric. That is, the
distortion metric cannot be simplified into two separate functions each one of which
depends only on one encoder’s observations. The nature of optimal strategies strongly
depends on the nature and extent of the coupling between the encoders.
Our model involves real-time distributed coding of correlated observations that
are to be transmitted over noisy channels. Information-theoretic results on asymptot-
ically achievable rate-regions have been known for some distributed coding problems.
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The first available results on distributed coding of correlated memoryless sources ap-
pear in Slepian and Wolf (1973a) and Slepian and Wolf (1973b). Multiple access
channels with arbitrarily correlated sources were considered in Cover et al. (1980). In
Flynn and Gray (1987), the encoders make noisy observations of an i.i.d source. The
authors in Flynn and Gray (1987) characterize the achievable rates and distortions,
and propose two specific distributed source coding techniques. Coding of depen-
dent sources with separated encoders was considered in Wyner (1974). Constructive
methods for distributed source coding were presented in Zhao and Effros (2001), A.
Kh. Al Jabri and Al-Issa (1997) and Pradhan and Ramchandran (1999). In particu-
lar, Zhao and Effros (2001) address lossless and nearly lossless source coding for the
multiple access system, and A. Kh. Al Jabri and Al-Issa (1997) addresses zero-error
distributed source coding. The CEO problem, where a number of encoders make con-
ditionally independent observations of an i.i.d source, was presented in Berger et al.
(1996). The case where the number of encoders tends to infinity was investigated
there. The quadratic Gaussian case of the CEO problem has been investigated in
Viswanathan and Berger (1997), Oohama (1998) and Draper and Wornell (2002).
Bounds on the achievable rate-regions for finitely many encoders were found in Chen
et al. (2004). A lossy extension of the Slepian-Wolf problem was analyzed in Berger
and S.Tung (1975) and Zamir and Berger (1999). Multi-terminal source coding for
memoryless Gaussian sources was considered in Oohama (1997).
In Krithivasan and Pradhan (2007), Gelfand and Pinsker (1979), Korner and Mar-
ton (1979), Han and Kobayashi (1987), Ahlswede and Han (1983) and Csiszar and
Korner (1981), distributed source coding problems with the objective of reconstruct-
ing a function of the source are investigated. In Krithivasan and Pradhan (2007), the
authors consider distributed source coding of a pair of correlated Gaussian sources.
The objective is to reconstruct a linear combination of the two sources. The authors
discover an inner bound on the optimal rate-distortion region and provide a coding
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scheme that achieves a portion of this inner bound. The problem of distributed source
coding to reconstruct a function of the sources losslessly was considered in Gelfand
and Pinsker (1979). An inner bound was obtained for the performance limit which
was shown to be optimal if the sources are conditionally independent given the func-
tion. The case of lossless reconstruction of the modulo-2 sum of two correlated binary
sources was considered in Korner and Marton (1979). These results were extended
in Csiszar and Korner (1981) (see Problem 23 on page 400) and Han and Kobayashi
(1987). An improved inner bound for the problem in Korner and Marton (1979) was
provided in Ahlswede and Han (1983).
The real-time constraint of our problem differentiates it from the information-
theoretic results mentioned above. Real-time communication problems for point-to-
point systems have been studied using a decision-theoretic/stochastic control perspec-
tive. In general, two types of results have been obtained for point to point systems.
One type of results establish qualitative properties of optimal encoding and decoding
strategies. The central idea here has been to consider the encoders and the decoders
as control agents/decision-makers in a team trying to optimize a common objective
of minimizing a distortion metric between the source and its estimates at the re-
ceiver. Such sequential dynamic teams - where the agents sequentially make multiple
decisions in time and may influence each other’s information - involve the solution
of non-convex functional optimization to find the best strategies for the agents (Y.
C. Ho (1980),Witsenhausen (1968)). However, if the strategies of all but one of the
agents are fixed, the resulting problem of optimizing a single agent’s strategy can, in
many cases, be posed in the framework of Markov decision theory. This approach
can explain some of the structural results obtained in Witsenhausen (1978), Teneket-
zis (2006), Walrand and Varaiya (1983a), Borkar et al. (2001), Yuksel and Basar
(2008). Another class of results establish a decomposition of the problem of choosing
a sequence of globally optimal encoding and decoding functions. In the resulting
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decomposition, at each step, the optimization is over one encoding and decoding
functions instead of a sequence of functions. This optimization, however, must be
repeated for all realizations of an information state that captures the effect of past
encoding/decoding functions (see Walrand and Varaiya (1983a), Borkar et al. (2001),
Mahajan and Teneketzis (2008), Mahajan (2008)).
Inspired by the decision-theoretic approach to real-time point-to-point systems,
we look at our problem from a decentralized stochastic control/team-theoretic per-
spective with the encoders and the receiver as our control agents/decision makers.
We are primarily interested in discovering the structure of optimal real-time encoding
and decoding functions. In other words, given all the observations available to an
agent (i.e, an encoder or the receiver), what is a sufficient statistic to decide its ac-
tion (i.e, the symbol to be transmitted in case of the encoders and the best estimate
in case of the receiver)? The structure of optimal real-time encoding and decoding
strategies provides insights into their essential complexity (for example, the mem-
ory requirements at the encoders and the receiver for finite and infinite time horizon
communication problems) as well as the effect of the coupling between the encoders
mentioned earlier.
A universal approach for discovering the structure of optimal real-time encod-
ing/decoding strategies in a multi-terminal system with any general form of correla-
tion between the encoders’ observations has so far remained elusive. In this chapter,
we restrict ourselves to a simple model for the encoders’ observations. For such a
model (described in Section 2.3), we obtain results on the structure of optimal real-
time encoding strategies when the receiver is assumed to a have a finite memory.
Our results reveal that for any time horizon, however large (or even infinite), there
exists a finite dimensional sufficient statistic for the encoders. This implies that an
encoder with a memory that can store a fixed finite number of real-numbers can per-
form as well as encoders with arbitrarily large memories. Subsequently, we consider
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communication with noiseless channels and remove the assumption of having limited
receiver memory. For this problem, the approach in Section 2.3 results in sufficient
statistics for the encoders that belong to spaces which keep increasing with time. This
is undesirable if one wishes to look at problems with large/infinite time-horizons. In
order to obtain a sufficient statistic with time-invariant domain, we invent a new
methodology for decentralized decision-making problems. This methodology high-
lights the importance of common information/ common knowledge (in the sense of
Aumann (1976)), in determining structural properties of decision makers in a team.
In general, the resulting sufficient statistic belongs to an infinite dimensional space.
However, we present special cases where a finite dimensional representation is pos-
sible. Moreover, we believe that the infinite dimensional sufficient statistic may be
intelligently approximated to obtain real-time finite-memory encoding strategies with
good performance.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.2 we present a real-
time multi-terminal communication system and formulate the optimization problem.
In Section 2.3 we present our assumptions on the nature of the source and the receiver
and obtain structural results for optimal real-time encoding and decoding functions.
In Section 2.4 we consider the problem with noiseless channels and perfect receiver
memory. We develop a new methodology to find structural results for optimal real-
time encoders for this case. We look at some extensions and special cases of our
results in Section 2.5. We conclude in Section 2.6.
2.2 A Real-Time Multi-terminal Communication Problem
Consider the real-time communication system shown in Figure 2.1. We have
two encoders that partially observe a Markov source and communicate it to a single
receiver over separate noisy channels. The receiver may be interested in estimating
the state of the Markov source or some function of the state of the source. We wish to
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find sufficient statistics for the encoders and the receiver and/or qualitative properties




















Figure 2.1: A Multi-terminal Communication System
2.2.1 Problem Formulation






where X it ∈ X i, i = 1, 2 and X 1,X 2 are finite spaces. The time-evolution of the
source is given by the following equation
Xt+1 = Ft(Xt,Wt) (2.1)
where Wt, t = 1, 2, .. is a sequence of independent random variables that are indepen-
dent of the initial state X1.
Two encoders make partial observations of the source. In particular, at time
t, encoder 1 observes X1t and encoder 2 observes X
2
t . The encoders have perfect
memory, that is, they remember all their past observations and actions. At each time
t, encoder 1 sends a symbol Z1t belonging to a finite alphabet Z1 to the receiver. The
encoders operate in real-time, that is, each encoder can select the symbol to be sent
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at time t, based only on the information available to it till that time. That is, the
















1:t−1 represents the sequence
Z11 , Z
1
2 , . . . , Z
1
t−1. In general, one can allow randomized encoding rules instead of
deterministic encoding functions. That is, for each realization of its observations till
time t, encoder 1 selects a probability distribution on Z1 and then transmits a random
symbol generated according to the selected distribution. We will show later that,
under our assumptions on the model, such randomized encoding rules cannot provide
any performance gain and we can restrict our attention to deterministic encoding
functions.
Encoder 2 operates in a similar fashion as encoder 1. Thus, encoding rules of encoder 2








where Z2t belongs to finite alphabet Z2.
The symbols Z1t and Z
2
t are transmitted over separate noisy channels to a single
receiver. The channel noises at time t are mutually independent random variables N1t











t , . . .) form a collection of independent random variables
that are independent of the source process Xt, t = 1, 2, ....
The receiver receives Y 1t and Y
2
t which belong to finite alphabets Y1 and Y2
respectively. The received symbols are noisy versions of the transmitted symbols
according to known channel functions h1t and h
2
t , that is,








for i = 1, 2.
At each time t, the receiver produces an estimate of the source Xˆt based on the






A non-negative distortion function ρt(Xt, Xˆt) measures the instantaneous distortion
between the source and the estimate at time t. (Note that the distortion function
may take into account that the receiver only needs to estimate a function of X1t and
X2t )
2) The Optimization Problem P : Given the source and noise statistics, the en-
coding alphabets, the channel functions h1t , h
2
t , the distortion functions ρt and a time
horizon T , the objective is to find globally optimal encoding and decoding functions
f 11:T , f
2
1:T , g1:T so as to minimize
J(f 11:T , f
2




where the expectation in (2.6) is over the joint distribution of X1:T and Xˆ1:T which
is determined by the given source and noise statistics and the choice of encoding and
decoding functions f 11:T , f
2
1:T , g1:T .
We refer to the collection of functions f i1:T as encoder i’s strategy (i = 1, 2). The
collection of functions g1:T is the decoding strategy.
Remarks: 1. Since we consider only finite alphabets for the source, the encoded
symbols, the channel noise, the received symbols and a finite time horizon, the number
of possible choices of encoding and decoding functions is finite. Therefore, an optimal
choice of strategies (f 11:T , f
2
1:T , g1:T ) always exists.
2. A brute force search method to find the optimal can always be used in principle.
It is clear however that even for small time-horizons, the number of possible choices
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would be large enough to make such a search inefficient. Moreover, such a scheme
would not be able to identify any characteristics of optimal encoding and decoding
functions.
The encoding functions and the decoding functions in equations (2.2), (2.3) and
(2.5) require the encoders and the receiver to store entire sequences of their past
observations and actions. For large time-horizons storing all past data becomes pro-
hibitive. Therefore, one must decide what part of the information contained in these
arbitrarily large sequences is sufficient for decision-making at the encoders and the
receiver. In particular, we are interested in addressing the following questions:
1. Is there a sufficient statistic for the encoders and the decoder that belongs to
a time-invariant space? (Clearly, all the past data available at an agent is a
sufficient statistic but it belongs to a space that keeps increasing with time.) If
such a sufficient statistic exists, one can potentially look at problems with large
(or infinite) time-horizons.
2. Is there a finite-dimensional sufficient statistic for the encoders and the receiver?
If such a sufficient statistic exists, then we can replace the requirement of storing
arbitrarily long sequences of past observations/messages with storing a fixed
finite number of real numbers at the encoders and the receiver.
The above communication problem can be viewed as a sequential team problem
where the encoders and the receiver are the decision-making agents that are sequen-
tially making decisions to optimize a common objective. The communication problem
is a dynamic team problem since the encoders’ decisions influence the information
available to the receiver. Dynamic team problems are known to be hard. For dy-
namic teams, a general answer to the questions on the existence of sufficient statistics
that either have time-invariant domains or are finite-dimensional is not known. In
21
the next section we will make simplifying assumptions on the nature of the source
and the receiver and present sufficient statistics for the encoders and the receiver.
2.3 Problem P1
We consider the optimization problem (Problem P) formulated in the previous
section under the following assumptions on the source and the receiver.
1. Assumption A1 on the Source: We assume that the time-evolution of the source















where A is a random-variable taking values in the finite set A and W 1t , t = 1, 2, ... and
W 2t , t = 1, 2... are two independent noise processes (that is, sequences of independent
random variables) that are independent of the initial state (X11 , X
2
1 ) and A as well.
Thus, the transition probabilities satisfy:
P (X1t+1, X
2
t+1|X1t , X2t , A)
=P (X1t+1|X1t , A) · P (X2t+1|X2t , A) (2.8)
The initial state of the Markov source has known statistics that satisfy the following
equation :
P (X11 , X
2




1 |A) · P (A)
=P (X11 |A) · P (X21 |A) · P (A) (2.9)
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Thus, A is a time-invariant random variable that couples the evolution of X1t and X
2
t .
Note that conditioned on A, X1t and X
2






t , A) (2.10)
which belongs to the space X := X 1 ×X 2 ×A.
The encoders’ model is same as before. Thus encoder 1 observes X1t and encoder 2
observes X2t . Note that the random variable A is not observed by any encoder. The
encoders have perfect memories and the encoding functions are given by equations
(2.2) and (2.3).
2. Assumption A2 on the Receiver: We have a finite memory receiver that main-
tains a separate memory for symbols received from each channel. This memory is
updated as follows:




1 ), i = 1, 2 (2.11a)






t ), i = 1, 2 (2.11b)
where M it belongs to finite alphabet Mi, i = 1, 2 and lit are the memory update
functions at time t for i = 1, 2. For notational convenience, we define M i0 := 0 for
i = 1, 2. The receiver produces an estimate of the source Xˆt based on its memory










We now formulate the following problem.
Problem P1: With assumptions A1 and A2 as above, and given source and noise
statistics, the encoding alphabets, the channel functions h1t , h
2
t , the distortion func-
tions ρt and a time horizon T , the objective is to find globally optimal encoding,
23
decoding and memory update functions f 11:T , f
2




1:T so as to minimize
J(f 11:T , f
2








where the expectation in (2.13) is over the joint distribution of X1:T and Xˆ1:T which
is determined by the given source and noise statistics and the choice of encoding,
decoding and memory update functions f 11:T , f
2

























Figure 2.2: Problem P1
2.3.1 Features of the Model
We discuss situations that give rise to models similar to that of Problem P1.
1. A Sensor Network: Consider a sensor network where the sensors’ observations
are influenced by a slowly varying global parameter and varying local phenomena.
Our model is an approximation of this situation where A models the global param-
eter that is constant over the time-horizon T and X it are the local factors at the
location of the ith sensor at time t. A finite memory assumption on the receiver may
be justified in situations where the receiver is itself a node in the network and is
coordinating the individual sensors. We will show that this assumption implies that
the sensors (encoders in our model) themselves can operate on finite-dimensional suf-
ficient statistics without losing any optimality with respect to sensors with perfect
(infinite) memory.
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2. Decentralized Detection/Estimation Problem: Consider the following scenario
of a decentralized detection problem; Sensors make noisy observations X it on the state
A of environment. Sensors must encode their information in real-time and send it to a
fusion center. Assuming that sensor noises are independent, we have that, conditioned
on A, the sensor observations are independent. (Typically, the observations are also
assumed to be i.i.d in time conditioned on the state of the environment, but we allow









Consider the case where Zit can either be “blank” or a value from the set A. Each
sensor is restricted to send only one non-blank message, and within a fixed time-
horizon each sensor must send its final non-blank message. When a sensor sends a
non-blank message Zit , the fusion center receives a noisy version Y
i
t of this message. As
long as the fusion center does not receive final (non-blank) messages from all sensors,
its decision is Xˆt = “no decision”. If all sensors have sent a non-blank message, the
fusion center produces an estimate Xˆt ∈ A as its final estimate on A and incurs a
distortion cost ρ(A, Xˆt). Thus, we can view the receiver as maintaining a separated














t−1 = “blank” for some sensor











The above detection problem therefore is a special case of our model with fixed
memory update rules from (2.14).
Clearly, our model also includes the case when the encoders’ observations are
independent Markov chains (not just conditionally independent). In this case, the
coupling between encoders is only due to the fact the receiver may be interested
in estimating some function of the state of the two Markov chains and not their
respective individual states.
2.3.2 Structure Result for Encoding Functions
We define the following probability mass functions (pmf) for encoder i, (i = 1, 2):
Definition II.1. For t = 1, 2, . . . , T and a ∈ A,
bit(a) := P (A = a|X i1:t)
Definition II.2. For t = 2, 3, . . . , T and m ∈Mi,
µit(m) := P (M
i
t−1 = m|Zi1:t−1, li1:t−1)
where li1:t−1 in the conditioning indicate that µ
i
t is defined for a fixed choice of the
memory update rules li1:t−1. For notational convenience, we also define for each m ∈
Mi, i = 1, 2,
µi1(m) := 0










where f it are deterministic functions for t = 1, 2, . . . , T and i = 1, 2.
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Discussion: In contrast to equation (2.2), Theorem II.3 says that an optimal
encoder 1 only needs to use the current observation X1t and the probability mass
functions b1t , µ
1
t that act as a compressed representation of the past observations X
1
1:t−1
and Z11:t−1. These pmfs represent the encoder 1’s belief on A and M
1
t−1.
To obtain the result of Theorem II.3 for the encoder 1, we fix arbitrary encoding
rules for the encoder 2 of the form in (2.3), arbitrary memory update rules of the form
in (2.11) and arbitrary decoding rules of the form in (2.12). Given these functions, we
consider the problem of selecting optimal encoding rules for encoder 1. We identify
a structural property of the optimal encoding rules of encoder 1 that is independent
of the arbitrary choice of strategies for encoder 2 and the receiver. We conclude that
the identified structure of optimal rules of encoder 1 must also be true when encoder
2 and the receiver are using the globally optimal strategies. Hence, the identified
structure is true for globally optimal encoding rules of encoder 1. We now present
this argument in detail.
Consider arbitrary (but fixed) encoding rules for encoder 2 of the of the form
in (2.3), arbitrary memory update rules for the receiver of the form in (2.11) and
arbitrary decoding rules of the form in (2.12). We will prove Theorem II.3 using the
following lemmas.











where α1t , t = 2, 3, . . . , T are deterministic functions.
Proof. See Appendix A.










where β1t , t = 2, 3, . . . , T are deterministic functions.
Proof. See Appendix A.








for t = 1, 2, . . . , T .













Lemma II.6. R1t , t = 1, 2, ..., T is a perfectly observed controlled Markov process for
encoder 1 with Z1t as the control action at time t.





it is perfectly observed at encoder 1.
Let x11:t, z
1




























t+1|x11:t, b˜11:t, µ˜11:t, z11:t)
= P (b˜1t+1, µ˜
1
t+1|x1t+1, x11:t, b˜11:t, µ˜11:t, z11:t)
×P (x1t+1|x11:t, b˜11:t, µ˜11:t, z11:t) (2.20)
= P (b˜1t+1, µ˜
1
t+1|x1t+1, x1t , b˜1t , µ˜1t , z1t )
×P (x1t+1|x11:t, b˜11:t, µ˜11:t, z11:t) (2.21)
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where the first term in (2.21) is true because of Lemma II.4 and Lemma II.5. Consider
the second term in (2.21). It can be expressed as follows:








P (x1t+1|A = a, x11:t, b˜11:t, µ˜11:t, z11:t)




P (x1t+1|A = a, x1t ).b˜1t (a) (2.24)
where the first term in (2.24) is true because of the Markov property of X1t when
conditioned on A. Therefore, substituting (2.24) in (2.21), we get






t+1)|x11:t, b˜11:t, µ˜11:t, z11:t)
=P (b˜1t+1, µ˜
1




[P (x1t+1|A = a, x1t )× b˜1t (a)] (2.25)






t from the entire collection
of conditioning variables in the left hand side of (2.25). Hence,
P (R1t+1|r11:t, z11:t) =P (R1t+1|x11:t, b˜11:t, µ˜11:t, z11:t)
=P (R1t+1|x1t , b˜1t , µ˜1t , z1t )
=P (R1t+1|r1t , z1t ) (2.26)
This establishes the lemma.
Lemma II.7. The expected instantaneous distortion cost for encoder 1 can be ex-
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pressed as :
E{ρt(Xt, Xˆt)|X11:t, Z11:t} = ρˆt(R1t , Z1t ) (2.27)
where ρˆt, t = 1, 2, . . . , T are deterministic functions.








=E{ρt(x1t , X2t , A, gt(Y 1t , Y 2t ,M1t−1,M2t−1)|x11:t, z11:t)} (2.28)
The expectation in (2.28) depends on x1t (appearing in the argument of ρt) and the








t−1|x11:t, z11:t). We can evaluate this
conditional probability as follows:
P (X2t = x
2



























t−1|A = a, Y 1t = y1t ,M1t−1 = m1t−1, x11:t, z11:t)
× P (Y 1t |A = a,M1t−1 = m1t−1, x11:t, z11:t)
× P (M1t−1 = m1t−1|A = a, x11:t, z11:t)
× P (A = a|x11:t, z11:t) (2.30)











P (Y 1t = y
1
t |z1t )× P (M1t−1 = m1t−1|z11:t)× P (A = a|x11:t) (2.31)











P (Y 1t = y
1
t |z1t )× µ˜1t (m1t−1)× b˜1t (a) (2.32)
In the first term of (2.31), we used the fact that conditioned on A, the observations
of encoder 2 and received messages from the second channel are independent of the
observations of encoder 1 and the messages received from the first channel. We used
the fact that the noise variables N1t are i.i.d and independent of the source in the
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second and third term of (2.31). Thus, the conditional probability in (2.29) depends




















Proof of Theorem II.3. From Lemma II.6 and Lemma II.7, we conclude that the op-
timization problem for encoder 1, when the strategies of encoder 2 and the receiver
have been fixed, is equivalent to controlling the transition probabilities of the con-





be any function of R11:t and Z
1
1:t−1) in order to minimize
∑T
t=1E{ρˆt(R1t , Z1t )}. It is a
well-known result of Markov decision theory (Kumar and Varaiya (1986b), Chapter
















Moreover, it also follows from Markov decision theory that allowing randomized con-
trol policies for encoder 1 cannot provide any performance gain. Since the above
structure of the optimal choice of encoder 1’s strategy is true for any arbitrary choice
of encoder 2’s and the receiver’s strategies, we conclude that the above structure of
optimal encoder 1 is true when the encoder 2 and the receiver are using their globally
optimal choices as well. Therefore, the above structure is true for globally optimal
strategy of encoder 1 as well. This completes the proof of Theorem II.3. Structural
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result for encoder 2 follows from the same arguments simply by interchanging the
roles of encoder 1 and encoder 2.
2.3.3 Structural result for Decoding Functions
We now present the structure of an optimal decoding strategy. Consider fixed
encoding rules of the form in (2.2) and (2.3) and fixed memory update rules of the
form in (2.11). We define the following probability mass function for the receiver :
Definition II.8. For x ∈ X and t = 1, 2, . . . , T ,
ψt(x) := P (Xt = x|Y 1t , Y 2t ,M1t−1,M2t−1, f 11:t, f 21:t, l11:t, l21:t)






1:t in the conditioning indicate that ψt is defined
for a fixed choice of encoding and memory update strategies.
Let ∆(X ) denote the set of probability mass functions on the finite set X . We
define the following functions on ∆(X ).






With the above definitions, we can present the result on the structure of a globally
optimal decoding rule.
Theorem II.10. For any fixed encoding rules of the form in (2.2) and (2.3) and
memory update rules of the form in (2.11), there is an optimal decoding rule of the
form
Xˆt = τt(ψt) (2.35)
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where the belief ψt is formed using the fixed encoding and memory update rules. In
particular, equation (2.35) is true for a globally optimal receiver, when the fixed en-
coding rules and memory update rules are the globally optimal rules.
Proof. The result follows from standard statistical decision theory DeGroot (1970).
2.3.4 Discussion of the Result
Theorem II.3 identifies sufficient statistics for the encoders. Instead of storing
all past observations and transmitted messages, each encoder may store only the
probability mass functions (pmf) on the finite sets A and Mi generated from past
observations and transmitted messages. Thus we have finite-dimensional sufficient
statistics for the encoders that belong to time-invariant spaces (the space of pmfs on
A and Mi). Clearly, this amounts to storing a fixed number of real-numbers in the
memory of each encoder instead of arbitrarily large sequences of past observations
and past transmitted symbols. However, the encoders now have to incur an addi-
tional computational burden involved in updating their beliefs on A and the receiver
memory.
We would like to emphasize that the presence of a finite dimensional sufficient
statistic that belong to time-invariant spaces is strongly dependent on the nature of
the source and the receiver. Indeed, without the conditionally independent nature of
the encoders’ observations or the separated finite memories at the receiver, we have
not been able to identify a sufficient statistic whose domain does not keep increasing
with time. For example, if the finite memory receiver maintained a coupled memory
which is updated as:
Mt = lt(Mt−1, Y 1t , Y
2
t )
then one may conjecture that the encoder could use a belief on Mt−1 as a sufficient
representation of past transmitted symbols, analogous to µ1t in Theorem II.3. How-
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ever, such a statistic cannot be updated without remembering all past data, that is,
an update equation analogous to Lemma II.5 for µ1t does not hold. This implies that
the Markov decision-theoretic arguments of Theorem II.3 do not work for this case.
In the case when encoders’ observations have a more general correlation structure,
a finite dimensional statistic like b1t that compresses all the past observations seems
unlikely. It appears that in the absence of the assumptions mentioned above, the
optimal encoders should remember all their past information.
If the receiver has perfect memory, that is, it remembers all past messages received,
(M it−1 = Y
i
1:t−1, i = 1, 2), Theorem II.3 implies µ
i
t = P (Y
i
1:t−1|Zi1:t−1) as a part of the
sufficient statistic for encoder i. Thus, Theorem II.3 says that each encoder needs
to store beliefs on the increasing space of all past observations at the receiver. This
sufficient statistic does not belong to a time-invariant space. In the next section, we
will consider this problem with noiseless channels and show that for noiseless channels
there is in fact a sufficient statistic that belongs to a time-invariant space. However,
this sufficient statistic is no longer finite dimensional and for implementation purposes,
one would have to come up with approximate representations of it.
2.4 Problem P2
We now look at the Problem P1 with noiseless channels. Firstly, we assume the
same model for the nature of the source and the separated memories at the receiver
as in Problem P1. The result of Theorem II.3 then holds with the belief on M it−1
replaced by the true value of M it−1. The presence of noiseless channels implies that
encoder i and the receiver have some common information. That is, at time t they
both know the state of M it−1.In this section, we will show that the presence of common
information allows us to explore the case when the receiver may have perfect memory.
We will present a new methodology that exploits the presence of common information
between the encoder and the receiver to find sufficient statistics for the encoders that
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belong to time-invariant spaces.
2.4.1 Problem Formulation
1. The Model: We consider the same model as in P1 with following two modifica-
tions:
(a) The channels are noiseless; thus the received symbol Y it is same as the
transmitted symbol Zit , for i = 1, 2 and t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
(b) The receiver has perfect memory, that is, it remembers all the past received
symbols. Thus, M it−1 = Z
i
1:t−1, for i = 1, 2 and t = 2, 3, . . . , T . (See Fig.
2.3)
2. The Optimization Problem, P2 : Given the source statistics, the encoding al-
phabets, the time horizon T, the distortion functions ρt, the objective is to
find globally optimal encoding and decoding functions f 11:T , f
2
1:T , g1:T so as to
minimize
J(f 11:T , f
2




where the expectation in (2.36) is over the joint distribution of X1:T and Xˆ1:T
which is determined by the given source statistics and the choice of encoding
and decoding functions f 11:T , f
2
1:T , g1:T .
2.4.2 Structure of the Receiver
Clearly, problem P2 is a special case of problem P1. The decoder structure of P1
can now be restated for P2 as follows: For fixed encoding rules of the form in (2.2)
and (2.3), we can define the receiver’s belief on the source as:

















Figure 2.3: Problem P2
for x ∈ X and t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
Theorem II.11. For any fixed encoding rules of the form in (2.2) and (2.3), there
is an optimal decoding rule of the form
Xˆt = τt(ψt) (2.37)
where the belief ψt is formed using the fixed encoding rules and τt is as defined in
Definition II.9. In particular, equation (2.37) is true for a globally optimal receiver,
when the fixed encoding rules are globally optimal rules.
2.4.3 Structural Result for Encoding Functions




µ˜it(m) = P (M
i
t−1 = m|zi1:t−1) =




























Observe that the domain of the encoding functions in (2.39) keeps increasing with
time since it includes all past transmitted symbols Z11:t−1. We would like to find a
sufficient statistic that belongs to a time-invariant space. Such a statistic would allow
us to address problems with large (or infinite) time horizons.
For that matter, let us first review the approach used for obtaining the first struc-
tural result for the encoders (Theorem II.3). We fixed the strategy of encoder 2 and
the receiver to any arbitrary choice and looked at the optimization problem P1 from
encoder 1’s perspective. Essentially, we addressed the following question: if encoder 2
and the receiver have fixed their strategies, how can we characterize the best strategy
of encoder 1 in response to the other agents’ fixed strategies? In other words, with
f 21:T and g1:T as fixed, what kind of strategies of encoder 1 (f
1
1:T ) minimize the ob-
jective in equation (2.13)? This approach allowed us to formulate a Markov decision
problem for encoder 1. The Markov decision problem gave us a sufficient statistic for
encoder 1 that holds for any choice of strategies of encoder 2 and the receiver and this
led to the result of Theorem II.3. In problem P2, such an approach gives the result
of equation (2.39) - which implies a sufficient statistic whose domain keeps increasing
with time.
To proceed further, we need to adopt a different approach. As before, we will
make an arbitrary choice of encoder 2’s strategy of the form in (2.3). Given this fixed
encoder 2, we will now ask, what are the jointly optimal strategies for encoder 1 and
the receiver? That is, assuming f 21:T is fixed, what choice of f
1
1:T and g1:T together
minimize the objective in equation (2.36)? From our previous structural results, we
know that we can restrict to encoding rules f 11:T of the form in (2.39) and decoding
rules from Theorem II.11 without any loss of optimality. We thus have the following
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problem:
Problem P2’: In Problem P2, with encoder 2’s strategy fixed to an arbitrary choice
f ′21:T , find the jointly optimal strategies of encoder 1 of the form in (2.39) and of the
receiver in Theorem II.11 to minimize
J(f 11:T , f
′2




Problem P2’ is in some sense a real-time point-to-point communication problem
with side information at the receiver. This is now a decentralized team problem with
the first encoder and the receiver as the two agents. Note that encoder 1 influences
the decisions at the receiver not only by the symbols Z1t it sends but by the entire
encoding functions it employs (since the receiver’s belief ψt depends on the choice
of encoding functions f 11:t). A general way to solve such dynamic team problems
is to search through the space of all strategies to identify the best choice. For our
problem (and for many team problems), this is not a useful approach for two reasons:
1) Complexity - the space of all strategies is clearly too large even for small time
horizons, thus making a brute force search prohibitive. 2) More importantly, such
a method does not reveal any characteristic of the optimal strategies and does not
lead to the identification of a sufficient statistic. We will therefore adopt a different
philosophy to address our problem.
Our approach is to first consider a modified version of problem P2’. We will con-
struct this modified problem in such a way so as to ensure that:
(a) The new problem is a single agent problem instead of a team problem. Single
agent centralized problems (in certain cases) can be studied through the framework
of Markov decision theory and dynamic programming.
(b) The new problem is equivalent to the original team problem. We will show that






















Figure 2.4: Coordinator’s Problem P2”
We proceed as follows:
Step 1: We introduce a centralized stochastic control problem from the point of view
of a fictitious agent who knows the “common information” between encoder 1 and
the receiver.
Step 2: We argue that the centralized problem of Step 1 is equivalent to the original
decentralized team problem.
Step 3: We solve the centralized stochastic control problem by identifying an infor-
mation state and employing dynamic programming arguments. The solution of this
problem will reveal a sufficient statistic with a time-invariant domain for encoder 1.
Below, we elaborate on these steps.
Step 1: We observe that the first encoder and the receiver have some common
information. At time t, they both know Z11:t−1. We now formulate a centralized prob-
lem from the perspective of a fictitious agent that knows just the common information
Z11:t−1. We call this fictitious agent the “coordinator” (See Fig. 2.4).
The system operates as follows in this new problem: Based on Z11:t−1, the coordi-
nator selects a partial-encoding function
w1t : X 1 ×∆(A) −→ Z1
An encoding function of the form in (2.39) can be thought of as a collection of
mappings from X 1 × ∆(A) to Z1 - one for each realization of Z11:t−1. Clearly, w1t
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represents one such mapping corresponding to the true realization of Z11:t−1 that was
observed by the coordinator. (At t = 1, since there is no past common information,
the partial-encoding rule w11 is simply f
1
1 which is a mapping from X 1×∆(A) to Z1.)
The coordinator informs the encoder 1 of its choice w1t . The encoder 1 then uses w
1
t
on its observations X1t and b
1








The coordinator also informs the receiver of the partial-encoding function. The re-
ceiver at each time t, forms its belief on the state of the source based on the received
symbols, the partial-encoding functions and the fixed strategy of encoder 2. This
belief is
ψt(x) := P (Xt = x|z11:t, z21:t, w11:t, f ′21:t)






The coordinator then observes the symbol Z1t sent from encoder 1 to the receiver and
then selects the partial-encoding function for time t+1 (w1t+1). The system continues
like this from time t = 1 to T . The objective of the coordinator is to minimize the





We then have the following problem:
Problem P2”: In Problem P2, with encoder 2’s strategy fixed to the same choice f ′21:T
as in P2’ and with a coordinator between encoder 1 and the receiver as described
above, find an optimal selection rule for the coordinator, that is find the mappings
40






so as to minimize the total expected distortion over time T .
(Note we have included the past decisions (w11:t−1) of the coordinator in the argument
of Λt since they themselves are functions of the past observations Z
1
1:t−1).
Remark: Under a given selection rule for the coordinator, the function w1t is a ran-
dom variable whose realization depends on the realization of past Z1t−1 which, in
turn, depends on the realization of the source process and the past partial-encoding
functions.
Step 2: We now argue that the original team problem P2’ is equivalent to the
problem in the presence of the coordinator (Problem P2”). Specifically, we show that
any achievable value of the objective (that is, the total expected distortion over time
T ) in problem P2’ can also be achieved in problem P2” and vice versa. Consider
first any selection rule Λt, t = 1, 2, ..., T for the coordinator. Since the coordinator in
Step 1 only knows the common information between encoder 1 and the receiver, it
implies that all information available at the coordinator is in fact available to both
encoder 1 and the receiver. Thus, the selection rule Λt of the coordinator can be used
by both encoder 1 and the receiver to determine the partial-encoding function, w1t ,
to be used at time t even when the coordinator is not actually present. Therefore,
the coordinator can effectively be simulated by encoder 1 and the receiver, and hence
any achievable value of the objective in Problem P2” with the coordinator can be
achieved even in the absence of a physical coordinator.
Conversely, in Problem P2’ consider any strategy f 11:T of encoder 1 and the cor-
responding optimal receiver given by Theorem II.11. Now consider the following
selection rule for the coordinator in P2”: At each time t, after having observed z11:t−1,
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the coordinator selects the following partial encoding function.
w1t (·) = f 1t (·, z1t−1)
Then it is clear that for every realization of the source, encoder 1 in Problem P2”
will produce the same realization of encoded symbols as encoder 1 of Problem P2’.
Consequently the above selection rule of the coordinator will induce the same joint




1:T ) as the encoding rules f
1
1:T for encoder 1 in problem P2’.
Then the receivers in Problem P2’ and Problem P2” will have the same conditional
belief ψt and will make the same estimates (given by Theorem II.11 and equation
(2.41) respectively). Thus any achievable value of the objective in Problem P2’ can
also be achieved in Problem P2”.
The above equivalence allows us to focus on the coordinator’s problem to solve
the original problem P2’. We now argue that the coordinator’s problem is in fact a
single agent centralized problem for which Markov decision-theoretic results can be
employed.
Step 3: To further describe the coordinator’s problem we need the following
definition and lemma.



















for x1t ∈ X 1 and b˜1t ∈ ∆(A).
For notational convenience, we define ξ10 := 0.
Remark: Recall that b1t is encoder 1’s posterior belief on A given its observations
X1t . Due to finiteness of the space X 1, b1t can only take one of finitely many values
from the set ∆(A). Hence, ξ(x1t , ·) is a purely atomic measure on the space ∆(A)
with finite number of atoms.
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Lemma II.13. For a fixed strategy of encoder 2, there is an optimal decoding rule of
the form:





where δt, t = 1, 2, . . . , T are fixed transformations that depend only on source statistics
and the fixed strategy of encoder 2 and τt, t = 1, 2, . . . , T are the decoding functions
as defined in Definition II.9.
Proof. See Appendix A.
From equations (2.40) and (2.42), it follows that in the coordinator’s problem
P2”, encoder 1 and the receiver are simply implementors of fixed transformations.
They do not make any decisions. Thus, in this formulation, the coordinator is the
sole decision maker. We now analyze the centralized problem for the coordinator.
Firstly, observe that at time t, the coordinator knows its observations so far - Z11:t−1
and the partial encoding functions it used so far - w11:t−1; it then selects an “action”
w1t and makes the next “observation” Z
1
t . In particular, note that the coordinator
has perfect recall, that is, it remembers all its past observations and actions-this is
a critical characteristic of classical centralized problems for which Markov decision-
theoretic results hold.
We can now prove the following lemma :











where γ1t , t = 2, . . . , T are fixed transformations that depend only on the source
statistics.
2. For a fixed strategy of the second encoder, the expected instantaneous cost from
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the coordinator’s perspective can be written as:
E{ρt(Xt, Xˆt)|Z11:t, w11:t} = ρt(ξ1t ) (2.44)
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T , where ρt are deterministic functions.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Based on Lemma II.14, we obtain the following result on the coordinator’s opti-
mization problem.
Theorem II.15. For any given selection rule Λt, t = 1, 2..., T for the coordinator,
there exists another selection rule Gt, t = 1, 2, ..., T that selects the partial-encoding
function to be used at time t, (w1t ) based only on ξ
1
t−1 and whose performance is no
worse than that of Λt, t = 1, 2, ..., T . Therefore, one can optimally restrict to selection




Proof. Because of Lemma II.14, the optimization problem for the coordinator is to
control the evolution of ξ1t (given by (2.43)) through its actions w
1
t , when the instan-
taneous cost depends only on ξ1t . Since ξ
1
t is known to the coordinator, this problem
is similar to the control of a perfectly observed Markov process. This observation es-
sentially implies the result of the theorem, as it follows from Markov decision theory
(Kumar and Varaiya (1986b), Chapter 6) that to control a perfectly observed Markov
process one can restrict attention to policies that depend only on the current state of
the Markov process without any loss of optimality.
We have therefore identified the structure of the coordinator’s selection rule. The




can operate optimally by just using ξ1t−1. We can thus conclude the following result.
Theorem II.16. In Problem P2, there is no loss of optimality in considering decoding
rules of the form in Theorem II.11 with encoders that operate as follows:



















t (·, ξit−1)) (2.47)
where γit are fixed transformations (Lemma II.14).
Proof. The assertion of the the theorem follows from Theorem II.15 and the equiv-
alence between problem P2’ and P2” established in Step 2. The coordinator (either
real or simulated by encoder 1 and receiver) can select the partial encoding functions


















t−1 that was used to select w
1










where w1t (·) = f 1t (·, ξ1t−1). The coordinator (real or simulated) then updates ξ1t−1
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The same argument holds for encoder 2 as well.
2.4.4 Discussion
Observe that Z11:t−1 appearing in the argument of optimal encoding functions in
(2.39) have been replaced by ξ1t−1. By definition, ξ
1
t is a joint belief on X 1 and ∆(A),
therefore, ξ1t belongs to a time-invariant space, namely, the space of joint beliefs on
X 1 and ∆(A). Thus the domain of the optimal encoding functions in (2.46) is time-
invariant. However, ξ1t above is a joint belief on a finitely-valued random variable
(X1t ) and a real-valued vector (b
1
t ). Thus, we have an infinite-dimensional sufficient
statistic for the encoder. Clearly, such a sufficient statistic can not be directly used
for implementation. However, it may still be used in identifying good approximations
to optimal encoders. Below, we present some cases where the above structural result
may suggest finite-dimensional representations of the sufficient statistic.
2.4.5 Special Cases
2.4.5.1 A observed at the Encoders
Consider the case when the encoder’s observations at time t = 1 include the
realization of the random variable A. Clearly, the encoder’s belief on A, (bit) can be
replaced by the true value of A in Theorem II.16. Thus, for problem P2, there is an





t , A, P (X
1
t−1, A|Z11:t−1, f 11:t−1)) (2.48)
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Since A belongs to a finite set, the domain of the encoding functions in (2.48) consists
of the scalars X1t and A and a belief on the finite space X 1 × A. Thus when A is
observed at the encoders, we have a finite dimensional sufficient statistic for each
encoder.
2.4.5.2 Independent Observations at Encoders
Consider the case when the encoders’ observations are independent Markov chains.
This is essentially the case when A is constant with probability 1. Then, effectively,





t , P (X
1
t−1|Z11:t−1, f 11:t−1)) (2.49)
and we have a finite dimensional sufficient statistic for the encoders.
2.5 Extensions
We apply our results for Problems P1 to P2 to other related problems in this
section.




















X1t , ..., X
n
t , A
Figure 2.5: Problem with n encoders
Consider the model of Figure 2.5 where we have n (n > 2) encoders that partially
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observe a Markov source and encode their observations, in real-time, into sequences of
discrete symbols that are transmitted over separate noisy channels (with independent
noise) to a common receiver. We make assumptions analogous to assumptions A1 and
A2 for Problem P1, that is,





t , ..., X
n
t , A)
where A is a time-invariant random variable and conditioned on A, X1t , X
2
t , ..., X
n
t
are conditionally independent Markov chains. The ith encoder observes the process








for i = 1, 2, ..., n.
2. Assumption 2: We have a finite memory receiver that maintains a separate
memory for symbols received from each channel. This memory is updated as follows:




1 ), i = 1, 2, ..., n (2.50a)






t ), i = 1, 2, ..., n (2.50b)
where M it belongs to finite alphabet Mi, and lit are the memory update functions at
time t for i = 1, 2, ..., n. The receiver produces an estimate of the source Xˆt based on














A non-negative distortion function ρt(Xt, Xˆt) measures the instantaneous distortion
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at time t. We can now formulate the following problem.
Problem P3: With the assumptions 1 and 2 as above, and given source and channel
statistics, the encoding alphabets, the distortion functions ρt and a time horizon T,
the objective is to find globally optimal encoding, decoding and memory update
functions f 11:T , f
2
1:T , ..., f
n




1:T , ..., l
n





For this problem we can establish, by arguments similar to those used in the problems
with two encoders, the following results that are analogous to Theorem II.3 and
Theorem II.16 respectively.










where bit := P (A|X i1:t) and µit := P (M it−1|Zi1:t−1, li1:t−1). The optimal decoding rules
are of the form:
Xˆt = τt(ψt) (2.54)
where ψt := P (Xt|Y 1t , Y 2t , ..., Y nt ,M1t−1,M2t−1, ...,Mnt−1) and τt is as defined in Defini-
tion II.9.
Proof. Consider any arbitrary choice of encoding functions for encoder 2 through
encoder n and arbitrary choice of the decoding and memory update functions at the
receiver. Then the problem for encoder 1 is essentially same as in the case when
n = 2.
Theorem II.18. Consider Problem P3 with noiseless channel (that is, Y it = Z
i
t) and
perfect receiver memory (that is , M it−1 = Z
i
1:t−1). Then there is no loss of optimality
in considering decoding rules of the form Xˆt = τt(ψt) where ψt = P (Xt|Z11:t, ..., Zn1:t)
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with encoders that operate as follows:



















t (·, ξit−1)) (2.56)
where γit are fixed transformations (Lemma II.14).
Proof. The result follows from Theorem II.16 using similar arguments as in the proof
of Theorem II.17.
2.5.2 Point-to-Point Systems


















Figure 2.6: Side-Information Problem




Then the multi-terminal communication problems reduce to a point-to-point commu-
nication problems with side-information available at the receiver (See, for example,
Fig 2.6). It is clear that the results of Theorem II.3 and Theorem II.10, for noisy chan-
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nels, and Theorem II.16, for noiseless channels, remain valid for these side-information
problems as well (since they are true for any arbitrary choice of encoder 2’s strategy).
2.5.2.2 Unknown Transition Matrix
Consider a point-to-point communication system where an encoder is communi-
cating its observations of a Markov source Xt to a receiver (Fig. 2.7). The channel
may be noisy or noiseless, the receiver may have finite memory or perfect recall. Struc-
tural results for optimal real-time encoding rules have been obtained in cases when
the transition probabilities of the Markov source are known (Witsenhausen (1978),
Teneketzis (2006)). Consider now the case where the encoder observes a Markov
chain Xt whose transition matrix is not known. However, the set of possible tran-
sition matrices is parameterized by a parameter A with a known prior distribution
over a finite set A. The encoding functions are of the form:
Zt = ft(X1:t, Z1:t−1)
where Zt is the transmitted symbol at time t. The receiver receives a noisy version
of Zt given by
Yt = ht(Zt, Nt)




where Mt ∈M, ∀t. The receiver’s estimate at time t is given as:
Xˆt = gt(Yt,Mt−1)
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A non-negative distortion function ρt(Xt, Xˆt) measures the instantaneous distortion










Figure 2.7: Point-to-point system with unknown source statistics
Problem P4: Given the source and receiver model as above and the noise statistics,
the encoding alphabets, the channel functions ht, the distortion functions ρt and
a time horizon T, the objective is to find globally optimal encoding, decoding and
memory update functions f1:T , g1:T , l1:T so as to minimize




The methodology employed for the analysis of Problem P1 can be used to establish
the following result.
Theorem II.19. There exist globally optimal encoding rules of the form :
Zt = ft(Xt, bt, µt) (2.58)
where bt := P (A|X1:t) and µt := P (Mt−1|Z1:t−1, l1:t−1). The optimal decoding rules
are of the form:
Xˆt = τt(ψt) (2.59)
where ψt := P (Xt|Yt,Mt−1, f1:t, l1:t) and τt is as defined in Definition II.9.
Proof. We can view the optimization problem P4 as a special case of Problem P1 with
an imaginary second encoder that makes no observations of the source and sends no
message to the receiver (that is, the set X 2 and Z2 are empty). Thus, the results of
the above theorem follow from Theorem II.3 and Theorem II.10.
52
The methodology developed for the analysis of Problem P2 can be used to obtain
the following result.
Theorem II.20. Consider Problem P4 with noiseless channel (that is, Yt = Zt) and
perfect receiver memory (that is , Mt−1 = Z1:t−1). Then there is no loss of optimality
in considering encoding rules of the form:
Zt = ft(Xt, bt, ξt−1)
where bt := P (A|X1:t) and
ξt−1 := P (Xt−1, bt−1|Z1:t−1)
with decoding rules of the form:
Xˆt = τt(ψt) (2.60)
where ψt := P (Xt = x|Z1:t) and τt is as defined in Definition II.9.
Proof. The result follows from Theorem II.16 using similar arguments as in the proof
of Theorem II.20.
2.5.3 kth order Markov Source























Thus, conditioned on a global, time-invariant random variable A, X1t and X
2
t are con-
ditionally independent kth order Markov processes. It is straightforward to consider
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for i = 1, 2. Thus, we now have a Markov system (when conditioned on A) - with Bit
as the encoder i’s observations - for which our structural results directly apply.
2.5.4 Communication with Finite Delay




The above objective can be interpreted as the total expected distortion incurred
when the receiver can allow a small finite delay, d, before making its final estimate on
the state of the source. Thus, the receiver produces a sequence of source estimates
Xˆd+1, Xˆd+2, ..., XˆT+d, and incurs a distortion
T+d∑
t=d+1
E[ρt(Xt−d, Xˆt)]. We can transform
this problem to our problem by the following regrouping of variables.

























Then, it is easily seen that conditioned on A, B1t and B
2
t are two conditionally in-
dependent Markov chains. Moreover, the distortion function ρt(Xt−d, Xˆt) can be
expressed as ρ˜(B1t , B
2
t , A, Xˆt). Thus, we have modified the problem to an instance of
Problem P1 or P2 with Bit as the encoder i’s observation.
2.6 Conclusion
We considered a real-time communication problem where two encoders make dis-
tinct partial observations of a discrete-time Markov source and communicate in real-
time with a common receiver which needs to estimate some function of the state of
the Markov source in real-time. We assumed a specific model for the source that
arises in some applications of interest. In this model, the encoders’ observations are
conditionally independent Markov chains given an unobserved, time-invariant ran-
dom variable. We formulated a communication problem with separate noisy channels
between each encoder and the receiver and a separated finite memory at the receiver.
We obtained finite-dimensional sufficient statistics for the encoders in this problem.
The structure of the source and the receiver played a critical role in obtaining these
results.
We then considered the communication problem over noiseless channels and per-
fect receiver memory. We used the presence of common information between an
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encoder and the receiver to identify a sufficient statistic of the decoder that has a
time-invariant domain.
The sufficient statistics we found for the encoders are analogous to the belief state
of partially observable Markov decision problems Kumar and Varaiya (1986b). For
such problems, under suitable conditions, it is known that the expected future cost
of an action is a continuous function of the belief state Smallwood and Sondik (1973).
We believe such results also hold for the encoder’s decision problem in Problem P1 and
the coordinator’s decision problem in Problem P2. This would suggest that sufficient
statistics that are “close to” each other will have similar future costs and the quanti-
zation of sufficient statistics may not result in large performance loss. Characterizing
the effect of such quantization on system performance as well as the robustness of
system performance with respect to quantization are currently open problems.
We have also not addressed the problem of finding globally optimal real-time en-
coding and decoding strategies in this paper. A sequential decomposition of the global
optimization problem, for a special case of the problems formulated here, appears in
Nayyar and Teneketzis (2008).
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CHAPTER III
Delayed Sharing Information Structures
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Motivation
One of the difficulties in optimal design of decentralized control systems is handling
the increase of data at the control stations with time. This increase in data means that
the domain of control laws increases with time which, in turn, creates two difficulties.
Firstly, the number of control strategies increases doubly exponentially with time;
this makes it harder to search for an optimal strategy. Secondly, even if an optimal
strategy is found, implementing functions with time increasing domain is difficult.
In centralized stochastic control (Kumar and Varaiya (1986a)), these difficulties
can be circumvented by using the conditional probability of the state given the data
available at the control station as a sufficient statistic (where the data available to a
control station comprises of all observations and control actions till the current time).
This conditional probability, called information state, takes values in a time-invariant
space. Consequently, we can restrict attention to control laws with time-invariant
domain. Such results, where data that is increasing with time is “compressed” to a
sufficient statistic taking values in a time-invariant space, are called structural results.
While the information state and structural result for centralized stochastic control
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problems is well known, no general methodology to find such information states or
structural results exists for decentralized stochastic control problems.
The structural results in centralized stochastic control are related to the concept
of separation. In centralized stochastic control, the information state, which is con-
ditional probability of the state given all the available data, does not depend on the
control strategy (which is the collection of control laws used at different time in-
stants). This has been called a one-way separation between estimation and control.
An important consequence of this separation is that for any given choice of control
laws till time t−1 and a given realization of the system variables till time t, the infor-
mation states at future times do not depend on the choice of the control law at time
t but only on the realization of control action at time t. Thus, the future information
states are separated from the choice of the current control law. This fact is crucial for
the formulation of the classical dynamic program where at each step the optimization
problem is to find the best control action for a given realization of the information
state. No analogous separation results are known for general decentralized systems.
In this chapter, we find structural results for decentralized control systems with
delayed sharing information structures. In a system with n-step delayed sharing,
every control station knows the n-step prior observations and control actions of all
other control stations. This information structure, proposed by Witsenhausen in Wit-
senhausen (1971), is a link between the classical information structures, where infor-
mation is shared perfectly among the controllers, and the non-classical information
structures, where there is no “lateral” sharing of information among the controllers.
Witsenhausen asserted a structural result for this model without any proof in his
seminal paper Witsenhausen (1971). Varaiya and Walrand Varaiya and Walrand
(1978) proved that Witsenhausen’s assertion was true for n = 1 but false for n > 1.
For n > 1, Kurtaran Kurtaran (1979) proposed another structural result. However,
Kurtaran proved his result only for the terminal time step (that is, the last time
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step in a finite horizon problem); for non-terminal time steps, he gave an abbreviated
argument, which we believe is incomplete. (The details are given in Section 3.5 of the
paper).
We prove two structural results of the optimal control laws for the delayed sharing
information structure. We compare our results to those conjectured by Witsenhausen
and show that our structural results for n-step delay sharing information structure
simplify to that of Witsenhausen for n = 1; for n > 1, our results are different from
the result proposed by Kurtaran.
We note that our structural results do not have the separated nature of centralized
stochastic control. That is, for any given realization of the system variables till time t,
the realization of information states at future times depend on the choice of the control
law at time t. However, our second structural result shows that this dependence only
propagates to the next n − 1 time steps. Thus, the information states from time
t+n− 1 onwards are separated from the choice of control laws before time t. We call
this a delayed separation between information states and control laws.
The absence of classical separation rules out the possibility of a classical dynamic
program to find the optimum control laws. However, optimal control laws can still
be found in a sequential manner. Based on the two structural results, we present
two sequential methodologies to find optimal control laws. Unlike classical dynamic
programs, each step in our sequential decomposition involves optimization over a
space of functions instead of the space of control actions.
3.1.2 Model
Consider a system consisting of a plant and K controllers (control stations) with
decentralized information. At time t, t = 1, . . . , T , the state of the plant Xt takes
values in a finite set X ; the control action Ukt at control station k, k = 1, . . . , K, takes
values in a finite set Uk. The initial state X0 of the plant is a random variable taking
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value in X . With time, the plant evolves according to
Xt = ft(Xt−1, U1:Kt , Vt) (3.1)
where Vt is a random variable taking values in a finite set V . {Vt; t = 1, . . . , T} is a
sequence of independent random variables that are also independent of X0.
The system has K observation posts. At time t, t = 1, . . . , T , the observation
Y kt of post k, k = 1, . . . , K, takes values in a finite set Yk. These observations are
generated according to





where W kt are random variables taking values in a finite set Wk. {W kt ; t = 1, . . . , T ;
k = 1, . . . , K} are independent random variables that are also independent of X0 and
{Vt; t = 1, . . . , T}.
The system has n-step delayed sharing. This means that at time t, control station
k observes the current observation Y kt of observation post k, the n steps old observa-
tions Y 1:Kt−n of all posts, and the n steps old actions U
1:K
t−n of all stations. Each station
has perfect recall; so, it remembers everything that it has seen and done in the past.








is the data known to all stations and





is the additional data known at station k, k = 1, . . . , K. Let Ct be the space of all
possible realizations of Ct; and Pk be the space of all possible realizations of P kt .
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Table 3.1: Summary of the control laws in the model for K = 2.

















Observations (shorthand) (Ct, P
1
t ) (Ct, P
2
t )
Control action U1t U
2
t
Control laws g1t g
2
t







t , Ct). (3.3)
The choice of g = {gkt ; k = 1, . . . , K; t = 1, . . . , T} is called a design or a
control strategy. G denotes the class of all possible designs. At time t, a cost
Rt(Xt, U
1
t , . . . , U
K
t ) is incurred. The performance J (g) of a design is given by the
expected total cost under it, i.e.,






where the expectation is with respect to the joint measure on all the system variables
induced by the choice of g. For reference, we summarize the notation of this model
in Table 3.1. We consider the following problem.
Problem 1. Given the statistics of the primitive random variables X0, {Vt; t =
1, . . . , T}, {W kt ; k = 1, . . . , K; t = 1, . . . , T}, the plant functions {ft; t = 1, . . . , T},
the observation functions {hkt ; k = 1, . . . , K; t = 1, . . . , T}, and the cost functions
{Rt; t = 1, . . . , T} choose a design g∗ from G that minimizes the expected cost given
by (3.4).
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Remarks on the Model
1. We assumed that all primitive random variables and all control actions take
values in finite sets for convenience of exposition. Similar results can be obtained
with uncountable sets under suitable technical conditions.
2. In the standard stochastic control literature, the dynamics and observations
equations are defined in a different manner than (3.1) and (3.2). The usual
model is
Xt+1 = ft(Xt, U
1:K
t , Vt) (3.5)





However, Witsenhausen Witsenhausen (1971) as well as Varaiya and Walrand Varaiya
and Walrand (1978) used the model of (3.1) and (3.2) in their papers. We use
the same model so that our results can be directly compared with earlier conjec-
tures and results. The arguments of this chapter can be used for the dynamics
and observation model of (3.5) and (3.6) with minor changes.
3.1.3 The structural results
Witsenhausen Witsenhausen (1971) asserted the following structural result for
Problem 1. Structural Result (Witsenhausen’s Conjecture Witsenhausen (1971)): In







Witsenhausen’s structural result claims that all control stations can “compress”
the common information Ct to a sufficient statistic P(Xt−n|Ct). Unlike Ct, the size of
P(Xt−n|Ct) does not increase with time.
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As mentioned earlier, Witsenhausen asserted this result without a proof. Varaiya
and Walrand Varaiya and Walrand (1978) proved that the above separation result is
true for n = 1 but false for n > 1. Kurtaran Kurtaran (1979) proposed an alternate
structural result for n > 1.
Structural Result (Kurtaran Kurtaran (1979)): In Problem 1, without loss of










Kurtaran used a different labeling of the time indices, so the statement of the
result in his paper is slightly different from what we have stated above.
Kurtaran’s result claims that all control stations can “compress” the common
information Ct to a sufficient statistic Pg
1:K
1:t−1(Xt−n, U1:Kt−n+1:t−1|Ct), whose size does
not increase with time.
Kurtaran proved his result for only the terminal time-step and gave an abbreviated
argument for non-terminal time-steps. We believe that his proof is incomplete for
reasons that we point out in Section 3.5. In this chapter, we prove two alternative
structural results.
First Structural Result: In Problem 1, without loss of optimality we can restrict







1:t−1(Xt−1, P 1:Kt |Ct)
)
. (3.9)
This result claims that all control stations can “compress” the common informa-
tion Ct to a sufficient statistic Pg
1:K
1:t−1(Xt−1, P 1:Kt |Ct), whose size does not increase
with time.
Second Structural Result: In Problem 1, without loss of optimality we can restrict
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P kt ,P(Xt−n|Ct), r1:Kt
)
. (3.10)
where r1:Kt is a collection of partial functions of the previous n − 1 control laws of
each controller,
rkt := {(gkm(·, Y km−n+1:t−n, Ukm−n+1:t−n, Cm),m = t − n + 1, t − n + 2, . . . , t − 1},
for k = 1, 2, . . . , K. Observe that rkt depends only on the previous n− 1 control laws





claims that the belief P(Xt−n|Ct) and the realization of the partial functions r1:Kt
form a sufficient representation of Ct in order to optimally select the control action
at time t.
Our structural results cannot be derived from Kurtaran’s result and vice-versa.
At present, we are not sure of the correctness of Kurtaran’s result. As we mentioned
before, we believe that the proof given by Kurtaran is incomplete. We have not been
able to complete Kurtaran’s proof; neither have we been able to find a counterexample
to his result.
Kurtaran’s and our structural results differ from those asserted by Witsenhausen
in a fundamental way. The sufficient statistic (also called information state) P(Xt−n|Ct)
of Witsenhausen’s assertion does not depend on the control strategy. That is, for any
realization ct of Ct, the knowledge of control laws is not required in evaluating the con-
ditional probabilities P(Xt−n = x|ct). The sufficient statistics Pg1:K1:t−1(Xt−n, U1:Kt−n+1:t−1|Ct)
of Kurtaran’s result and Pg1:K1:t−1(Xt−1, P 1:Kt |Ct) of our first result depend on the con-
trol laws used before time t. Thus, for a given realization ct of Ct, the realization of
information state depends on the choice of control laws before time t. On the other
hand, in our second structural result, the belief P(Xt−n|Ct) is indeed independent
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of the control strategy, however information about the previous n − 1 control laws
is still needed in the form of the partial functions r1:Kt . Since the partial functions
r1:Kt do not depend on control laws used before time t− n+ 1, we conclude that the
information state at time t is separated from the choice of control laws before time
t − n + 1. We call this a delayed separation between information states and control
laws.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We prove our first structural
result in Section 3.2. Then, in Section 3.3 we derive our second structural result. We
discuss a special case of delayed sharing information structures in Section 3.4. We
discuss Kurtaran’s structural result in Section 3.5 and conclude in Section 3.6.
3.2 Proof of the first structural result
In this section, we prove the structural result (3.9) for optimal strategies of the
K control stations. For the ease of notation, we first prove the result for K = 2, and
then show how to extend it for general K.
3.2.1 Two Controller system (K = 2)
The proof for K = 2 proceeds as follows:
1. First, we formulate a centralized stochastic control problem from the point of
view of a coordinator who observes the shared information Ct, but does not
observe the private information (P 1t , P
2
t ) of the two controllers.
2. Next, we argue that any strategy for the coordinator’s problem can be imple-
mented in the original problem and vice versa. Hence, the two problems are
equivalent.
3. Then, we identify states sufficient for input-output mapping for the coordina-
tor’s problem.
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4. Finally, we transform the coordinator’s problem into a MDP (Markov decision
process), and obtain a structural result for the coordinator’s problem. This
structural result is also a structural result for the delayed sharing information
strucutres due to the equivalence between the two problems.
Below, we elaborate on each of these stages.
Stage 1
We consider the following modified problem. In the model described in Sec-
tion 3.1.2, in addition to the two controllers, a coordinator that knows the common
(shared) information Ct available to both controllers at time t is present. At time t,
the coordinator decides the partial functions
γkt : Pk 7→ Uk
for each controller k, k = 1, 2. The choice of the partial functions at time t is based on
the realization of the common (shared) information and the partial functions selected
before time t. These functions map each controller’s private information P kt to its
control action Ukt at time t. The coordinator then informs all controllers of all the
partial functions it selected at time t. Each controller then uses its assigned partial






The system dynamics and the cost are same as in the original problem. At next
time step, the coordinator observes the new common observation
Zt+1 := {Y 1t−n+1, Y 2t−n+1, U1t−n+1, U2t−n+1}. (3.12)
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Control action γ1:Kt U
k
t
Control laws ψt γ
k
t
Thus at the next time, the coordinator knows Ct+1 = (Zt+1, Ct) and its choice of all
past partial functions and it selects the next partial functions for each controller. The
system proceeds sequentially in this manner until time horizon T .
In the above formulation, the only decision maker is the coordinator: the indi-
vidual controllers simply carry out the necessary evaluations prescribed by (3.11).
At time t, the coordinator knows the common (shared) information Ct and all past
partial functions γ11:t−1 and γ
2
1:t−1. The coordinator uses a decision rule ψt to map
this information to its decision, that is,
(γ1t , γ
2












1:t−1), k = 1, 2. (3.14)
For reference, we summarize the notation of this model in Table 3.2.
The choice of ψ = {ψt; t = 1, . . . , T} is called a coordination strategy. Ψ denotes
the class of all possible coordination strategies. The performance of a coordinating
strategy is given by the expected total cost under that strategy, that is,








where the expectation is with respect to the joint measure on all the system variables
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induced by the choice of ψ. The coordinator has to solve the following optimization
problem.
Problem 2 (The Coordinator’s Optimization Problem). Given the system model of
Problem 1, choose a coordination strategy ψ∗ from Ψ that minimizes the expected cost
given by (3.15).
Stage 2
We now show that the Problem 2 is equivalent to Problem 1. Specifically, we
will show that any design g for Problem 1 can be implemented by the coordinator in
Problem 2 with the same value of the problem objective. Conversely, any coordination
strategy ψ in Problem 2 can be implemented in Problem 1 with the same value of
the performance objective.
Any design g for Problem 1 can be implemented by the coordinator in Problem 2 as
follows. At time t the coordinator selects partial functions (γ1t , γ
2
t ) using the common
(shared) information ct as follows.
γkt (·) = gkt (·, ct) =: ψkt (ct), k = 1, 2. (3.16)
Consider Problems 1 and 2. Use design g in Problem 1 and coordination strategy
ψ given by (3.16) in Problem 2. Fix a specific realization of the initial state X0,
the plant disturbance {Vt; t = 1, . . . , T}, and the observation noise {W 1t ,W 2t ; t =
1, . . . , T}. Then, the choice of ψ according to (3.16) implies that the realization
of the state {Xt; t = 1, . . . , T}, the observations {Y 1t , Y 2t ; t = 1, . . . , T}, and the
control actions {U1t , U2t ; t = 1, . . . , T} are identical in Problem 1 and 2. Thus, any
design g for Problem 1 can be implemented by the coordinator in Problem 2 by
using a coordination strategy given by (3.16) and the total expected cost under g in
Problem 1 is same as the total expected cost under the coordination strategy given
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by (3.16) in Problem 2.
By a similar argument, any coordination strategy ψ for Problem 2 can be imple-
mented by the control stations in Problem 1 as follows. At time 1, both stations know








1(c1). Then station k chooses











1), k = 1, 2. (3.17a)




























2), k = 1, 2. (3.17b)





of them can compute (γ11:t, γ
2




















t ), k = 1, 2. (3.17c)
Now consider Problems 2 and 1. Use coordinator strategy ψ in Problem 2 and
design g given by (3.17) in Problem 1. Fix a specific realization of the initial state
X0, the plant disturbance {Vt; t = 1, . . . , T}, and the observation noise {W 1t ,W 2t ;
t = 1, . . . , T}. Then, the choice of g according to (3.17) implies that the realization
of the state {Xt; t = 1, . . . , T}, the observations {Y 1t , Y 2t ; t = 1, . . . , T}, and the
control actions {U1t , U2t ; t = 1, . . . , T} are identical in Problem 2 and 1. Hence,
any coordination strategy ψ for Problem 2 can be implemented by the stations in
Problem 1 by using a design given by (3.17) and the total expected cost under ψ
in Problem 2 is same as the total expected cost under the design given by (3.17) in
69
Problem 1.
Since Problems 1 and 2 are equivalent, we derive structural results for the latter
problem. Unlike, Problem 1, where we have multiple control stations, the coordinator
is the only decision maker in Problem 2.
Stage 3
We now look at Problem 2 as a controlled input-output system from the point of
view of the coordinator and identify a state sufficient for input-output mapping. From
the coordinator’s viewpoint, the input at time t has two components: a stochastic





a controlled input that consists of the partial functions γ1t , γ
2
t . The output is the




t ). We want
to identify a state sufficient for input-output mapping for this system. A variable
is a state sufficient for input output mapping of a control system if it satisfies the
following properties (see Witsenhausen (1976)).
1. P1: The next state is a function of the current state and the current inputs.
2. P2: The current output is function of the current state and the current inputs.
3. P3: The instantaneous cost is a function of the current state, the current control
inputs, and the next state.
We claim that such a state for Problem 2 is the following.
Definition III.1. For each t define
St := (Xt−1, P 1t , P
2
t ) (3.18)
Next we show that St, t = 1, 2, . . . , T+1, satisfy properties (P1)–(P3). Specifically,
we have the following.
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Proposition III.2.
1. There exist functions fˆt, t = 2, . . . , T such that









2. There exist functions hˆt, t = 2, . . . , T such that
Zt = hˆt(St−1). (3.20)









t , St+1). (3.21)
Proof. Part 1 is an immediate consequence of the definitions of St and P
k
t , the dy-
namics of the system given by (3.1), and the evaluations carried out by the control
stations according to (3.11). Part 2 is an immediate consequence of the definitions
of state St, observation Zt, and private information P
k
t . Part 3 is an immediate
consequence of the definition of state and the evaluations carried out by the control
stations according to (3.11).
Stage 4
Proposition III.2 establishes St as the state sufficient for input-output mapping
for the coordinator’s problem. We now define information states for the coordinator.
Definition III.3 (Information States). For a coordination strategy ψ, define infor-
mation states Πt as
Πt(st) := Pψ(St = st|Ct, γ11:t−1, γ21:t−1). (3.22)
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As shown in Proposition III.2, the state evolution of St depends on the controlled
inputs (γ1t , γ
2




t+1). This random noise is inde-
pendent across time. Consequently, Πt evolves in a controlled Markovian manner as
below.
Proposition III.4. For t = 1, . . . , T − 1, there exists functions Ft (which do not
depend on the coordinator’s strategy) such that




t , Zt+1). (3.23)
Proof. See Appendix B.
At t = 1, since there is no shared information, Π1 is simply the unconditional
probability P(S1) = P(X0, Y 11 , Y 21 ). Thus, Π1 is fixed a priori from the joint dis-
tribution of the primitive random variables and does not depend on the choice of
coordinator’s strategy ψ. Proposition III.4 shows that at t = 2, . . . , T , Πt depends
on the strategy ψ only through the choices of γ11:t−1 and γ
2
1:t−1. Moreover, as shown
in Proposition III.2, the instantaneous cost at time t can be written in terms of the




t ). Combining the
above two properties, we get the following:
Proposition III.5. The process Πt, t = 1, 2, . . . , T is a controlled Markov chain with
γ1t , γ
2
t as the control actions at time t, i.e.,
P(Πt+1|Ct,Π1:t, γ11:t, γ21:t) = P(Πt+1|Π1:t, γ11:t, γ21:t)
= P(Πt+1|Πt, γ1t , γ2t ).
(3.24)
Furthermore, there exists a deterministic function Ct such that
E{Rˆt(St, γ1t , γ2t , St+1)|Ct,Π1:t, γ11:t, γ21:t} = R˜t(Πt, γ11 , γ2t ). (3.25)
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Proof. See Appendix B.
The controlled Markov property of the process {Πt, t = 1, . . . , T} immediately
gives rise to the following structural result.
Theorem III.6. In Problem 2, without loss of optimality we can restrict attention
to coordination strategies of the form
(γ1t , γ
2
t ) = ψt(Πt), t = 1, . . . , T. (3.26)
Proof. From Proposition III.5, we conclude that the optimization problem for the
coordinator is to control the evolution of the controlled Markov process {Πt, t =
1, 2, . . . , T} by selecting the partial functions {γ1t , γ2t , t = 1, 2, . . . , T} in order to min-
imize
∑T
t=1 E{R˜t(Πt, γ1t , γ2t )}. This is an instance of the well-known Markov decision
problems where it is known that the optimal strategy is a function of the current
state. Thus, the structural result follows from Markov decision theory Kumar and
Varaiya (1986a).
The above result can also be stated in terms of the original problem.
Theorem III.7 (Structural Result). In Problem 1 with K = 2, without loss of opti-











1:t−1)(Xt−1, P 1t , P
2
t |Ct) (3.28)
where Π1 = P(X0, Y 11 , Y 21 ) and for t = 2, . . . , T , Πt is evaluated as follows:
Πt+1 = Ft+1(Πt, g
1
t (·,Πt), g2t (·,Πt), Zt+1) (3.29)
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Proof. Theorem III.6 established the structure of the optimal coordination strategy.
As we argued in Stage 2, this optimal coordination strategy can be implemented in
Problem 1 and is optimal for the objective (3.4). At t = 1, Π1 = P(X0, Y 11 , Y 21 )
is known to both controllers and they can use the optimal coordination strategy to

















1 ,Π1), k = 1, 2. (3.30)









t−n+1); they use the partial functions (g
1
t (·,Πt), g2t (·,Πt))










t+1,Πt+1), k = 1, 2. (3.31)
Moreover, using the design g defined according to (3.31), the coordinator’s informa-
tion state Πt can also be written as:
Πt = Pψ(Xt−1, P 1t , P 2t |Ct, γ11:t−1, γ21:t−1)
= Pg(Xt−1, P 1t , P 2t |Ct, g1:21 (·,Π1), . . . , g1:2t−1(·,Πt−1))
= P(g11:t−1,g21:t−1)(Xt−1, P 1t , P 2t |Ct) (3.32)
where we dropped the partial functions from the conditioning terms in (3.32) because
under the given control laws (g11:t−1, g
2
1:t−1), the partial functions used from time 1 to
t− 1 can be evaluated from Ct (by using Proposition III.4 to evaluate Π1:t−1).
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Theorem III.7 establishes the first structural result stated in Section 3.1.3 for
K = 2. In the next section, we show how to extend the result for general K.
3.2.2 Extension to General K
Theorem III.7 for two controllers (K = 2) can be easily extended to general K
by following the same sequence of arguments as in stages 1 to 4 above. Thus, at
time t, the coordinator introduced in Stage 1 now selects partial functions γkt : Pk 7→
Uk, for k = 1, 2, . . . , K. The state sufficient for input output mapping from the
coordinator’s perspective is given as St := (Xt−1, P 1:Kt ) and the information state Πt
for the coordinator is
Πt(st) := Pψ(St = st|Ct, γ1:K1:t−1). (3.33)
Results analogous to Propositions III.2–III.5 can now be used to conclude the struc-
tural result of Theorem III.7 for general K.
3.2.3 Sequential Decomposition
In addition to obtaining the structural result of Theorem III.7, the coordinator’s
problem also allows us to write a dynamic program for finding the optimal control
strategies as shown below. We first focus on the two controller case (K = 2) and then
extend the result to general K.
Theorem III.8. The optimal coordination strategy can be found by the following
dynamic program: For t = 1, . . . , T , define the functions Jt : P{S} 7→ R as follows.
For pi ∈ P{S} let













The arg inf (γ∗,1t , γ
∗,2
t ) in the RHS of Jt(pi) is the optimal action for the coordinator
at time t then Πt = pi. Thus,
(γ∗,1t , γ
∗,2
t ) = φ
∗
t (pi)
The corresponding control strategy for Problem 1, given by (3.17) is optimal for Prob-
lem 1.
Proof. As in Theorem III.6, we use the fact that the coordinator’s optimization prob-
lem can be viewed as a Markov decision problem with Πt as the state of the Markov
process. The dynamic program follows from standard results in Markov decision
theory Kumar and Varaiya (1986a). The optimality of the corresponding control
strategy for Problem 1 follows from the equivalence between the two problems.
The dynamic program of Theorem III.8 can be extended to general K in a manner
similar to Section 3.2.2.
3.2.4 Computational Aspects
In the dynamic program for the coordinator in Theorem III.8, the value func-
tions at each time are functions defined on the continuous space P{S}, whereas the
minimization at each time step is over the finite set of functions from the space of
realizations of the private information of controllers (Pk, k = 1, 2) to the space of con-
trol actions (Uk, k = 1, 2). While dynamic programs with continuous state space can
be hard to solve, we note that our dynamic program resembles the dynamic program
for partially observable Markov decision problems (POMDP). In particular, just as in
POMDP, the value-function at time T is piecewise linear in ΠT and by standard back-
ward recursion, it can be shown that value-function at time t is piecewise linear and
concave function of Πt. (See Appendix B). Indeed, the coordinator’s problem can be
viewed as a POMDP, with St as the underlying partially observed state and the belief
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Πt as the information state of the POMDP. The characterization of value functions
as piecewise linear and concave is utilized to find computationally efficient algorithms
for POMDPs. Such algorithmic solutions to general POMDPs are well-studied and
can be employed here. We refer the reader to Zhang (2009) and references therein
for a review of algorithms to solve POMDPs.
3.2.5 One-step Delay
We now focus on the one-step delayed sharing information structure, i.e., when n =
1. For this case, the structural result (3.7) asserted by Witsenhausen is correct Varaiya
and Walrand (1978). At first glance, that structural result looks different from our
structural result (3.9) for n = 1. In this section, we show that for n = 1, these two
structural results are equivalent.




























The result of Theorem III.7 can now be restated for this case as follows:
Corollary III.9. In Problem 1 with K = 2 and n = 1, without loss of optimality we












1:t−1)(Xt−1, Y 1t , Y
2
t |Ct) (3.37)
We can now compare our result for one-step delay with the structural result (3.7),
asserted in Witsenhausen (1971) and proved in Varaiya and Walrand (1978). For
n = 1, this result states that without loss of optimality, we can restrict attention to





t ,P(Xt−1|Ct)), k = 1, 2. (3.38)
The above structural result can be recovered from (3.37) by observing that there






1:t−1)(Xt−1, Y 1t , Y
2
t |Ct)
= P(Y 1t |Xt−1) · P(Y 2t |Xt−1)
· P(g11:t−1,g21:t−1)(Xt−1|Ct) (3.39)
As pointed out in Witsenhausen (1971); Varaiya and Walrand (1978) (and proved
later in this chapter in Proposition III.11), the last probability does not depend on
the functions (g11:t−1, g
2
1:t−1). Therefore,
Πt = P(Y 1t |Xt−1) · P(Y 2t |Xt−1) · P(Xt−1|Ct) (3.40)
Clearly, the belief P(Xt−1|Ct) is a marginal of Πt and therefore can be evaluated from
Πt. Moreover, given the belief P(Xt−1|Ct), one can evaluate Πt using equation (3.40).
This one-to-one correspondence between Πt and P(Xt−1|Ct) means that the structural
result proposed in this chapter for n = 1 is effectively equivalent to the one proved
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in Varaiya and Walrand (1978).
3.3 Proof of the second structural result
In this section we prove the second structural result (3.10). As in Section 3.2, we
prove the result for K = 2 and then show how to extend it for general K. To prove the
result, we reconsider the coordinator’s problem at Stage 3 of Section 3.2 and present
an alternative characterization for the coordinator’s optimal strategy in Problem 2.
The main idea in this section is to use the dynamics of the system evolution and the
observation equations (equations (3.1) and (3.2)) to find an equivalent representation
of the coordinator’s information state. We also contrast this information state with
that proposed by Witsenhausen.
3.3.1 Two controller system (K = 2)
Consider the coordinator’s problem with K = 2. Recall that γ1t and γ
2
t are the




t−n+1:t−1) to its action U
k
t . In order to find an alternate characterization
of coordinator’s optimal strategy, we need the following definitions:
Definition III.10. For a coordination strategy ψ, and for t = 1, 2, . . . , T we define
the following:
1. Θt := P(Xt−n|Ct)
2. For k = 1, 2, define the following partial functions of γkm
rkm,t(·) := γkm(·, Y km−n+1:t−n, Ukm−n+1:t−n),
m = t− n+ 1, t− n+ 2, . . . , t− 1 (3.41)
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m. We define a collection of
these partial functions as follows:
rkt := (r
k
m,t(·),m = t− n+ 1, t− n+ 2, . . . , t− 1) (3.42)
Note that for n = 1, rkt is empty.
We need the following results to address the coordinator’s problem:
Proposition III.11. 1. For t = 1, . . . , T − 1, there exists functions Qt, Qkt , k =
1, 2, (which do not depend on the coordinator’s strategy) such that





t , Zt+1, γ
k
t ) (3.43)





quently, for t = 1, . . . , T , there exist functions R˜t (which do not depend on the
coordinator’s strategy) such that
E{Rˆt(St, γ1t , γ2t , St+1)|Ct,Π1:t, γ11:t, γ21:t} = R˜t(Θt, r1t , r2t , γ1t , γ2t ) (3.44)









as the control actions at time t, i.e.,
P(Θt+1, r1t+1, r2t+1|Ct,Θ1:t, r11:t, r21:t, γ11:t, γ21:t)
= P(Θt+1, r1t+1, r2t+1|Θ1:t, r11:t, r21:t, γ11:t, γ21:t)
= P(Θt+1, r1t+1, r2t+1|Θt, r1t , r2t , γ1t , γ2t ). (3.45)
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Proof. See Appendix B.
At t = 1, since there is no sharing of information, Θ1 is simply the unconditioned
probability P(X0). Thus, Θ1 is fixed a priori from the joint distribution of the primi-
tive random variables and does not depend on the choice of the coordinator’s strategy
ψ. Proposition 4 shows that the update of Θt depends only on Zt+1 and not on the
coordinator’s strategy. Consequently, the belief Θt depends only on the distribution
of the primitive random variables and the realizations of Z1:t. We can now show that





t = 1, 2, . . . , T as the underlying Markov process.




t ) is an information state for the coordinator. That is,
there is an optimal coordination strategy of the form:
(γ1t , γ
2




t ), t = 1, . . . , T. (3.46)
Moreover, this optimal coordination strategy can be found by the following dynamic
program:
JT (θ, r˜














ΘT = θ, r
1:2
T = r˜




For t = 1, . . . , T − 1, let
Jt(θ, r˜


























where θ ∈ P(X ), and r˜1, r˜2 are realizations of partial functions defined in (3.41)
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and (3.42). The arg inf (γ∗,1t , γ
∗,2
t ) in the RHS of (3.48) is the optimal action for the















The corresponding control strategy for Problem 1, given by (3.17) is optimal for Prob-
lem 1.
Proof. Proposition III.11 implies that the coordinator’s optimization problem can be













t ) as the instantaneous cost. The MDP formulation implies the
result of the theorem.
The following result follows from Theorem III.12.
Theorem III.13 (Second Structural Result). In Problem 1 with K = 2, without loss









t ), k = 1, 2. (3.49)
where
Θt = P(Xt−n|Ct) (3.50)
and
rkt = {(gkm(·, Y km−n+1:t−n, Ukm−n+1:t−n, Cm), t − n + 1 ≤ m ≤ t − 1} (3.51)
Proof. As in Theorem III.7, equations (3.17) can be used to identify an optimal
control strategy for each controller from the optimal coordination strategy given in
Theorem III.12.
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Theorem III.12 and Theorem III.13 can be easily extended for K controllers by
identifying (Θt, r
1:K
t ) as the information state for the coordinator.
3.3.2 Comparison to Witsenhausen’s Result
We now compare the result of Theorem III.12 to Witsenhausen’s conjecture which






Recall that Witsenhausen’s conjecture is true for n = 1 but false for n > 1. Therefore,
we consider the cases n = 1 and n > 1 separately:
Delay n = 1


















r1t = ∅, r2t = ∅






t ,P(Xt−n|Ct)), k = 1, 2. (3.53)
Equation (3.53) is the same as equation (3.52) for n = 1. Thus, for n = 1, the
result of Theorem III.12 coincides with Witsenhausen’s conjecture which was proved
in Varaiya and Walrand (1978).
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Delay n > 1
Witsenhausen’s conjecture implied that the controller k at time t can choose its
action based only on the knowledge of P kt and P(Xt−n|Ct), without any dependence on
the choice of previous control laws (g1:21:t−1). In other words, the argument of the control
law gkt (that is, the information state at time t) is separated from g
1:2
1:t−1. However,
as Theorem III.13 shows, such a separation is not true because of the presence of
the collection of partial functions r1t , r
2
t in the argument of the optimal control law at
time t. These partial functions depend on the choice of previous n− 1 control laws.
Thus, the argument of gkt depends on the choice of g
1:2
t−n+1:t−1. One may argue that
Theorem III.13 can be viewed as a delayed or partial separation since the information
state for the control law gkt is separated from the choice of control laws before time
t− n+ 1.
Witsenhausen’s conjecture implied that controllers employ common information
only to form a belief on the state Xt−n; the controllers do not need to use the common
information to guess each other’s behavior from t− n+ 1 to the current time t. Our
result disproves this statement. We show that in addition to forming the belief on
Xt−n, each controller should use the common information to predict the actions of
other controllers by means of the partial functions r1t , r
2
t .
3.4 A Special Case of Delayed Sharing Information Structure
Many decentralized systems consist of coupled subsystems, where each subsystem
has a controller that perfectly observes the state of the subsystem. If all controllers
can exchange their observations and actions with a delay of n steps, then the system
is a special case of the n-step delayed sharing information structure with the following
assumptions:
1. Assumption 1: At time t = 1, . . . , T , the state of the system is given as the
84
vector Xt := (X
1:K
t ), where X
i
t is the state of subsystem i.
2. Assumption 2: The observation equation of the kth controller is given as:
Y kt = X
k
t−1 (3.54)
This model is similar to the model considered in Aicardi et al. (1987). Clearly,
the first structural result and the sequential decomposition of Section 3.2 apply here
as well with the observations Y kt being replaced by X
k
t . Our second structural result





1:t−n) = (X1:t−n−1, U
1:K
1:t−n) (3.55)
and therefore the belief,
Θt = P(Xt−n|Ct) = P(Xt−n|Xt−n−1, U1:Kt−n) (3.56)
where we used the controlled Markov nature of the system dynamics in the second
equality in (3.56). Thus, Θt is a function only of Xt−n−1, U1:Kt−n . The result of Theo-
rem III.12 can now be restated for this case as follows:
Corollary III.14. In Problem 1 with assumptions 1 and 2, there is an optimal co-
ordination strategy of the form:
(γ1t , γ
2








t ), t = 1, . . . , T. (3.57)


















1:2, r1:2T = r˜




For t = 1, . . . , T − 1, let
Jt(x, u
1, u2, r˜1, r˜2) = inf
γ˜1,γ˜2
E{R˜t(Xt−n, r1t , r2t , γ11 , γ2t )





1:2, r1:2t = r˜




We note that the structural result and the sequential decomposition in the corol-
lary above is analogous to (Aicardi et al., 1987, Theorem 1).
3.4.1 An Example
We consider a simple example of a delayed sharing information structure with
two controllers (K = 2), a time horizon T = 3 and delay n = 2. Varaiya and
Walrand Varaiya and Walrand (1978) used this example to show that Witsenhausen’s
proposed structure was suboptimal.
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3 ) = (X
1
2 −X22 − U13 , 0)
= (X10 +X
2
0 − U22 − U13 , 0)
X10 , X
2
0 are zero-mean, jointly Gaussian random variables with variance 1 and covari-
ance −0.5. The observation equations are:
Y kt = X
k
t−1
and the total cost function is
J (g) = Eg{(X13 )2 + (U13 )2} (3.60)
We can now specify the common and private informations. Common Information:
C1 = ∅, C2 = ∅,
C3 = {Y 11 , Y 21 , U11 , U21} = {X10 , X20 , U11 , U21}
Private Information for Controller 1:
P 11 = {Y 11 } = {X10},
P 12 = {Y 11 , Y 12 , U11} = {X10 , (X10 +X20 ), U11}
P 13 = {Y 12 , Y 13 , U12} = {(X10 +X20 ), (X10 +X20 ), U12}
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Private Information for Controller 2:
P 21 = {Y 21 } = {X20},
P 22 = {Y 21 , Y 22 , U21} = {X20 , 0, U21}
P 23 = {Y 22 , Y 23 , U22} = {0, U22 , U22}
The total cost can be written as:
J (g) = Eg{(X10 +X20 − U22 − U13 )2 + (U13 )2} (3.61)
Thus, the only control actions that affect the cost are U22 and U
1
3 . Hence, we can
even assume that all other control laws are constant functions with value 0 and the
performance of a design is completely characterized by control laws g22 and g
1
3. Using
the fact that all control actions other than U22 and U
1


















































t provide no new information and the structure of equation











For k = 1 and t = 3,
Θ3 = P(X1|C3) = P((X10 +X20 , 0)|X10 , X20 )
and
r23 = {(g2m(·, Y 2m−1:1, U2m−1:1, Cm), 2 ≤ m ≤ 2}
= {(g22(·, Y 21 , U21 , C2)}
= {(g22(·, X20 )} = U22 ,
while r13 are partial functions of constant functions. Therefore, equation (3.62) can


























where we used the fact that knowing P((X10 +X20 , 0)|X10 , X20 ) is same as knowing the
value of (X10 +X
2
0 ) in (3.64).
The optimal control laws can be obtained by solving the coordinator’s dynamic
program given in Theorem III.12. Observe that Θ3 = P((X10 + X20 , 0)|X10 , X20 ) is
equivalent to (X10 +X
2
0 ) and that r
2
3 is equivalent to U
2
2 . Thus, the dynamic program










E{(X13 )2 + (U13 )2|
(X10 +X
2
























































≥ (x10 + x20 − u22)2/2, (3.66)
where the right hand side in (3.66) is the lower bound on the expression (x10 + x
2
0 −
u22−u13)2 + (u13)2 for any u13. Given the fixed realization of ((x10 +x20), u22), choosing γ1
as a constant function with value (x10 +x
2
0−u22)/2 achieves the lower bound in (3.66).
For t = 2, the coordinator has no information and the value function at time t = 2 is
J2 = inf
γ˜2
E{J3((X10 +X20 ), U22 )|γ22 = γ˜2}
= inf
γ˜2
E{(X10 +X20 − U22 )2/2|γ22 = γ˜2} (3.67)
where γ˜2 maps P 12 = (X
2
0 ) to U
2
2 . The optimization problem in (3.67) is to choose,










































0 − U22 )/2 (3.69)
These are same as the unique optimal control laws identified in Varaiya and Walrand
(1978).
3.5 Kurtaran’s Separation Result
In this section, we focus on the structural result proposed by Kurtaran Kurtaran




































Kurtaran’s structural result for this case states that without loss of optimality we





t ,Φt), k = 1, 2, (3.70)
where
Φt := Pg{Xt−2, U1t−1, U2t−1|Ct}.
Kurtaran Kurtaran (1979) proved this result for the terminal time-step T and sim-
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ply stated that the result for t = 1, . . . , T − 1 can be established by the dynamic
programming argument given in Kurtaran (1976). We believe that this is not the
case.
In the dynamic programming argument in Kurtaran (1976), a critical step is the
update of the information state Φt, which is given by (Kurtaran, 1976, Eq (30)). For
the result presented in Kurtaran (1979), the corresponding equation is









We believe that such an update equation cannot be established.
To see the difficulty in establishing (3.71), lets follow an argument similar to the
proof of (Kurtaran, 1976, Eq (30)) given in (Kurtaran, 1976, Appendix B). For a
fixed strategy g, and a realization ct+1 of Ct+1, the realization ϕt+1 of Φt+1 is given
by
ϕt+1 = P(xt−1, u1t , u2t |ct+1)
= P(xt−1, u1t , u2t |ct, y1t−1, y2t−1, u1t−1, u2t−1)
=
P(xt−1, u1t , u2t , y1t−1, y2t−1, u1t−1, u2t−1|ct)∑
(x′,a1,a2)∈X×U1×U2
P(Xt−1 = x′, U1t = a1, U2t = a2, y1t−1, y2t−1, u1t−1, u2t−1 | ct)
(3.72)
The numerator can be expressed as:











t ] · 1g2t (ct,u2t−1,y2t−1,y2t )[u2t ]
· P(y1t |xt−1) · P(y2t |xt−1) · P(xt−1|xt−2, u1t−1, u2t−1)
· 1g1t−1(ct−1,u1t−2,y1t−2,y1t−1)[u1t−1] · 1g2t (ct−1,u2t−2,y2t−2,y2t−1)[u2t−2]
· P(y1t−1|xt−2) · P(y2t−1|xt−2) · P(xt−2|ct) (3.73)








t−1, each term of (3.73) depended only
on terms that are being summed over (xt−2, y1t , y
2
t ), then (3.73) would prove (3.71).
However, this is not the case: the first two terms also depend on ct. Therefore, the









This dependence on ct is not an artifact of the order in which we decided to use the
chain rule in (3.73) (we choose the natural sequential order in the system). No matter
how we try to write ϕt+1 in terms of ϕt, there will be a dependence on ct.
The above argument shows that it is not possible to establish (3.71). Conse-
quently, the dynamic programming argument presented in Kurtaran (1976) breaks
down when working with the information state of Kurtaran (1979), and, hence, the
proof in Kurtaran (1979) is incomplete. So far, we have not been able to correct the
proof or find a counterexample to it.
3.6 Conclusion
We studied the stochastic control problem with n-step delay sharing information
structure and established two structural results for it. Both the results characterize
optimal control laws with time-invariant domains. Our second result also establishes
a partial separation result, that is, it shows that the information state at time t is
separated from choice of laws before time t − n + 1. Both the results agree with
Witsenhausen’s conjecture for n = 1. To derive our structural results, we formulated
an alternative problem from the point of a coordinator of the system that knows
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the common information among the controllers. In the subsequent chapters, we will
extend this idea of formulating an alternative problem from the point of view of a




Common Information and the General Sequential
Decision-Making Problems
4.1 General Sequential Decision-Making Problems
In this Chapter, we consider a general model of sequential decision-making prob-
lems with finite number of decisions. We borrow the general model of a sequential
decision making problem from Witsenhausen (1973). We impose the assumption of
finiteness of the underlying probability space and finiteness of all observation and
decision spaces. Other than the assumptions of finiteness, the following model is gen-
eral enough to capture any sequential decision-making problem. As pointed out in
Witsenhausen (1973), any sequential stochastic control problem can be reduced to our
model by elimination of intermediate random variables.
We define the concepts of common information and private information for the
general problem. We then investigate the general sequential problem from the per-
spective of a coordinator who knows the common information and who has to pro-
vide prescriptions to each decision-maker on how to use their private information. We
show that the coordinator’s perspective allows us to formulate an equivalent decision-
making problem where the coordinator is the only decision maker (acting at multiple
times). The coordinator’s problem is a sequential problem with classical information
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structure for which we can identify an information state and a dynamic program
to find the optimal prescriptions that the coordinator prescribes to each decision-
maker. The coordinator’s dynamic program implies a sequential decomposition for
the general sequential decision-making problem.
The result of this chapter show that the common information methodology used in
Chapters II,III can be extended to any sequential decision-making problem with
finite spaces of observation and decisions and finite number of decisions. To the best of
our knowledge, the only other result that provides a sequential decomposition for the
general model is that by Witsenhausen (1973). Our result, however, is the first to use
the concept of common information. Thus, our sequential decomposition is different
from Witsehausen’s. Our sequential decomposition coincides with Witsenhausen’s
only in problems where common information is absent.
Further, our sequential decomposition specializes to the classical dynamic pro-
gram if the decision-making problem has a classical information structure. Thus, our
common information methodology shows that the classical dynamic programming
results of classical information structures and Witsenhausen’s sequential decomposi-
tion for non-classical information structures both follow from the same conceptual
framework of common information in sequential decision-making problems.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We present a general model of
sequential decision making problems in Section 4.1.1. We define private and common
information for this model in Section 4.1.2 and present a sequential decomposition
based on common information in Section 4.1.3. We consider two special cases of
sequential problems in Section 4.2 and conclude in Section 4.3.
Remark IV.1. When dealing with collections of random variables, we will at times
treat the collection as a random vector of appropriate dimension. At other times,
it will be convenient to think of different collections of random variables as sets on
which one can define the usual set operations. For example consider random vectors
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A = (A1, A2, A3) and A˜ = (A1, A2). Then, treating A and A˜ as sets would allow us
to write A ∩ A˜ = {A1, A2}.
4.1.1 The Model
The model we study consists of the following components:
Components of a general sequential decision making problem:
1. A finite probability space (Ω,B,P).
2. Primitive Random Variables: A collection Q = {Q1, Q2, . . . , QN} defined on
the above probability space (where N is a finite positive number). We will treat
Q as a random vector that takes values in a finite space Q endowed with the
power-set sigma algebra 2Q.
3. A finite number T of decision-makers (DMs) that make decisions in a pre-
determined sequence. Since the order of decisions is fixed, we may think of
each decision being made at the tick of a discrete time clock that runs from the
initial time t = 1 to the final time t = T . Any correspondence with physical
time is irrelevant for the decision problem.
4. Decision Spaces: For t = 1, 2, . . . , T , (Ut, 2Ut) are finite measurable spaces.
5. Observation Spaces and Observation Maps: For t = 1, 2, . . . , T , Nt is the finite
number of observations available for making the tth decision. We have the
following finite observation space
It = Y1t × Y2t × . . .× YNtt
equipped with the power-set sigma algebra.
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t , . . . , h
Nt
t ),
where for each j = 1, 2, . . . , Nt, h
j
t is a measurable map from (Q × U1 × U2 ×
. . .× Ut−1, 2Q × 2U1 × . . .× 2Ut−1) to (Yjt , 2Y
j
t ).
6. Reward: R is a real-valued function defined on the measurable space (Q×U1×
U2 × . . .× UT , 2Q × 2U1 × . . .× 2UT ).
7. Decision Strategy Space: The decision strategy space Gt is the set of all mea-
surable mappings from (It, 2It) to (Ut, 2Ut). The space of strategy profiles is
G := G1 × . . .× GT .
Description of the Decision-Making Problem:
The above components of the sequential decision making problem can be interpreted
as follows. The primitive random variablesQ = {Q1, Q2, . . . , QN} are variables chosen
by nature over which the designer has no control. In other words, the statistics and
the realizations of these random variables are independent of the choice of decision
strategy profile. The information available to the first decision-maker is a random vec-
tor I1 that takes values in the observation space I1. Further, I1 = (Y 11 , Y 21 , . . . , Y N11 ),
where for each j = 1, . . . , N1, Y
j
1 is related to the primitive random variables via an
observation map hj1. That is,
Y j1 = h
j
1(Q) (4.1)
The first decision maker uses a decision strategy g1 ∈ G1 to map its information to
its decision. Thus,
U1 = g1(I1) (4.2)
Subsequently, the information available to the second decision-maker is a random
vector I2 that takes values in the observation space I2. Further, I2 = (Y 12 , Y 22 , . . . , Y N22 ),
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where for each j = 1, . . . , N2, Y
j
2 is related to the primitive random variables and U1
via an observation map hj2. That is,
Y j2 = h
j
2(Q,U1) (4.3)
The second decision maker uses a decision strategy g2 ∈ G2 to map its information to
its decision. Thus,
U2 = g2(I2) (4.4)





t , . . . , Y
Nt
t ) that takes values in the observation space It and is given by
the observation maps
Y jt = h
j
t(Q,U1, U2, . . . , Ut−1), (4.5)
for j = 1, 2, . . . , Nt. The t
th decision maker uses a decision strategy gt ∈ Gt to map
its information to its decision. Thus,
Ut = gt(It) (4.6)
The collection g = (g1, g2, . . . , gT ) is referred to as a decision strategy profile,
while the function gt is referred to as a decision strategy/decision rule at time t.
Given a choice of decision strategy, the decisions U1, U2, . . . UT , the observation vec-
tors I1, I2, . . . IT as well as the reward R(Q,U1, U2, . . . , UT ) are well-defined random
variables.
The value of a decision strategy profile g is defined as
J (g) = Eg[R(Q,U1, U2, . . . , UT )] (4.7)
We can now formulate the following problem:
99
Problem 3. For the general model of sequential decision making problems described
above, choose a decision strategy profile g ∈ G in order to maximize the value J (g)
given by equation (4.7).
4.1.2 Private and Common Information





. . . , hNtt ), where for each j = 1, 2, . . . , Nt, h
j
t is a measurable map from (Q × U1 ×
U2× . . .×Ut−1, 2Q× 2U1 × . . .× 2Ut−1) to (Yjt , 2Y
j
t ). These observation maps represent
information about primitive random variables and preceding decisions that is available
to tth decision-maker.
Definition IV.2 (Equivalent Observation Maps). Consider the decision makers at
time t and t′, with t < t′. We will say that two observation maps hjt and h
k
t′ are
equivalent if Yjt = Ykt′ and for any q ∈ Q, and (u1, u2, . . . , ut′−1) ∈ U1×U2 . . .×Ut′−1,
hjt(q, u1, u2, . . . , ut−1) = h
k
t′(q, u1, u2, . . . , ut′−1)
Because equivalent observation maps provide the same information, we will treat
them as identical observation maps. With the above equivalence between observation
maps of different decision-makers, we will now define the common observation maps
at each time.
Definition IV.3 (Common Observation Maps). At each time t, we define Hcommont
to be the collection of all observation maps that are available to all decision makers
that act at or after time t. That is,
Hcommont := ∩k≥tHk, (4.8)
where we use the equivalence of observation maps defined in Definition IV.2 to identify
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identical observation maps in the right hand side of equation 4.8. We refer to Hcommont
as the collection of common observation maps.
Definition IV.4 (Private Observation Maps). At each time t, we define Hprivatet to
be the collection of all observation maps that is available to the tth decision maker
but not to all decision makers that act after the tth decision-maker. That is,
Hprivatet := Ht \Hcommont (4.9)
We refer to Hprivatet as the collection of private observation maps.
Definition IV.5 (Common Information). When a decision strategy profile has been
chosen, the common observation maps will result in observations that are available
to the tth decision maker as well as all decision makers that act after it. We define
the collection of these commonly known observations as the common information
at the tth decision, and we denote it by Ct. In terms of random variables that
are observable to different decision makers, we have
Ct = ∩k≥tIk, (4.10)
where Ik is interpreted as a collection of random variables. We denote by Ct the set
of all possible values of the random vector Ct.
Definition IV.6 (Private Information). When a decision strategy profile has been
chosen, the private observation maps will result in observations that are available to
the tth decision maker but not to all decision makers that act after it. We define the
collection of these observations as the private information at the tth decision,
and we denote it by Pt. In terms of random variables that are observable to
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different decision makers, we have
Pt = It \ Ct, (4.11)
where It, Ct is interpreted as collections of random variables. We denote by Pt the
set of all possible values of the random vector Pt.
Remark IV.7. By definition, we have that C1 ⊆ C2 ⊆ . . . ⊆ CT . We can define
Zt = Ct \ Ct−1 as the increase in common information from time t− 1 to t.
Remark IV.8. From the definitions of common and private information, any decision
rule of the form Ut = gt(It) can be written as Ut = gt(Pt, Ct).
4.1.3 A Sequential Decomposition
In this section, we provide a sequential decomposition for the problem of obtaining
an optimal decision strategy profile for Problem 3. We follow the same philosophy as
in the delayed sharing problem. We proceed as follows:
1. First, we formulate a centralized stochastic control problem from the point of
view of a coordinator who observes the common information Ct at each time
t, but does not observe the private information Pt. The coordinator’s problem
is to provide prescriptions to each decision-maker on how to map its private
information to its decision.
2. Next, we argue that for any strategy for the coordinator’s problem there is an
equivalent decision strategy profile in the original problem that achieves the
same expected reward and vice versa. Hence, the two problems are equivalent.
3. Finally, we transform the coordinator’s problem into a MDP (Markov decision
process), and obtain a sequential decomposition for the coordinator’s problem.
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This sequential decomposition is also a sequential decomposition for the original
problem due to the equivalence between the two problems.
Below, we elaborate on each of these stages.
Stage 1
We consider the following modified problem. In the model described in Sec-
tion 4.1.1, we introduce a coordinator that knows the common information Ct at
each time t. At time t, the coordinator decides the partial decision rule
γt : Pt 7→ Ut
In case Pt is empty, γt is simply an element of the set Ut.
The partial decision rule is to be interpreted as a prescription from the coordinator
to the tth decision maker informing it on how to use its private information to make
its decision. In the case where there is no private information (that is, It = Ct),
the prescription from the coordinator will simply be the decision for the tth decision
maker.
The choice of the partial decision rule at time t is based on the realization of
the common information and the partial decision rules selected before time t. The
coordinator then informs all decision makers that act at or after time t of the partial
decision rule it selected at time t. The decision maker acting at time t then uses its
assigned partial decision rule to generate a control action as follows.
Ut = γt(Pt). (4.12)
In the above formulation, the only decision maker is the coordinator: the individ-
ual decision makers simply carry out the necessary evaluations prescribed by (4.12).
At time t, the coordinator knows the common information Ct and all past partial
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decision rules γ1:t−1. The coordinator uses a decision rule ψt to map this information
to its decision, that is,
γt = ψt(Ct, γ1:t−1). (4.13)
The choice of ψ = {ψt; t = 1, . . . , T} is called a coordination strategy. Ψ denotes
the class of all possible coordination strategies. The performance of a coordinating
strategy is given by the expected total reward under that strategy, that is,
Jˆ (ψ) = Eψ{R(Q,U1, U2, . . . , UT )} (4.14)
where the expectation is with respect to the joint measure on all the system variables
induced by the choice of ψ. The coordinator has to solve the following optimization
problem.
Problem 4 (The Coordinator’s Optimization Problem). For the coordinator’s prob-
lem described above, choose a coordination strategy ψ from Ψ in order to maximize
the value J (ψ) given by equation (4.14).
Stage 2
We now show that the Problem 4 is equivalent to Problem 3. Specifically, we will
show that any decision strategy profile g for Problem 3 can be implemented by the
coordinator in Problem 4 with the same value of the problem objective. Conversely,
any coordination strategy ψ in Problem 4 can be implemented in Problem 3 with the
same value of the objective.
Any decision strategy profile g for Problem 3 can be implemented by the coordi-
nator in Problem 4 as follows. Let ct be the realization of common information at
time t. The coordinator selects partial decision rule γ˜t using the common information
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ct as follows.
γ˜t(·) = gt(·, ct) =: ψt(ct). (4.15)
Then, for any given realization of the primitive random variables, the choice of
ψ = (ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψT ) according to (4.15) implies that the realization of the the obser-
vations {It; t = 1, . . . , T}, and the control actions {Ut; t = 1, . . . , T} are identical in
Problems 3 and 4. Thus, any strategy profile g for Problem 3 can be implemented
by the coordinator in Problem 4 by using a coordination strategy given by (4.15) and
the total expected reward under g in Problem 3 is same as the total expected cost
under the coordination strategy given by (4.15) in Problem 4.
By a similar argument, any coordination strategy ψ for Problem 4 can be imple-
mented by the decision makers in Problem 3 as follows. At time 1, decision maker 1
knows c1; so, it can compute γ˜1 = ψ1(c1) and chooses action u1 = γ˜1(p1). Thus,
g1(p1, c1) = ψ1(c1)(p1). (4.16a)
At time 2, decision maker 2 knows c2 and γ˜1, since γ˜1 was chosen based on c1 which
is contained in c2. Therefore, decision maker 2 can compute γ˜2 = ψ2(c2, γ˜1). Then
decision maker 2 chooses action u2 = γ˜2(p2). Thus,
g2(p2, c2) = ψ2(c2, γ˜1)(p2). (4.16b)
Proceeding this way, at time t decision maker t knows ct and γ˜1:t−1, so it can compute
γ˜t = ψt(ct, γ˜1:t−1). Then, decision maker t chooses action ut = γ˜t(pt). Thus,
gt(pt, ct) = ψt(ct, γ˜1:t−1)(pt). (4.16c)
Then, for any given realization of the primitive random variables, the choice of
g according to (4.16) implies that the realization of the the observations {It; t =
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1, . . . , T}, and the control actions {Ut; t = 1, . . . , T} are identical in Problems 4
and 3. Thus, any design ψ for Problem 4 can be implemented in Problem 3 with the
same expected reward.
Since Problems 3 and 4 are equivalent, we derive a sequential decomposition for
the latter problem.
Stage 3
We now consider the coordinator’s problem formulated in Problem 4. We first
define information states for the coordinator.
Definition IV.9 (Information States). For a coordination strategy ψ, define infor-
mation states Πt, t = 1, 2, . . . , T as
Πt(q, u1, u2, . . . , ut−1) := Pψ(Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut−1 = ut−1|Ct, γ1:t−1).
(4.17)
We also define
ΠT+1(q, u1, u2, . . . , uT ) := Pψ(Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , UT = uT |CT , γ1:T ).
(4.18)
The following result shows how the coordinator’s information state evolves de-
pending on its observations and its decisions.
Proposition IV.10. For t = 1, . . . , T − 1, there exists functions Ft (which do not
depend on the coordinator’s strategy) such that
Πt+1 = Ft+1(Πt, γt, Zt+1), (4.19)
where Zt+1 = Ct+1 \ Ct. Further, there exists functions FT+1 (which does not depend
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on the coordinator’s strategy) such that
ΠT+1 = FT+1(ΠT , γT ). (4.20)
Proof. See Appendix C.
At t = 1, Π1(q) := Pψ(Q = q|C1) Since C1 ⊆ I1 which only depends on the
primitive random variables, it follows that the above conditional probability is inde-
pendent of the coordinator’s strategy ψ. Thus, Π1 does not depend on the choice of
coordinator’s strategy ψ. Proposition IV.10 shows that at t = 2, . . . , T , Πt depends
on the strategy ψ only through the choices of γ1:t−1.
Proposition IV.11. For the coordinator, the process Πt, t = 1, 2, . . . , T is a con-
trolled Markov chain with γt as the control action at time t, i.e.,
Pψ(Πt+1|Ct,Π1:t, γ1:t) = P(Πt+1|Π1:t, γ1:t) (4.21)
= P(Πt+1|Πt, γt), (4.22)
where the transition probabilities on the right hand side of (4.22) do not depend on
the coordination strategy ψ. Furthermore, there exists a deterministic real-valued
function R˜ defined on the space of PMFs on Q× U1 × . . .× UT such that
E{R(Q,U1, U2, . . . , UT )} = E{R˜(ΠT+1)}. (4.23)
Proof. See Appendix C.
The controlled Markov property of the process {Πt, t = 1, . . . , T} immediately
gives rise to the following result.
Theorem IV.12. In Problem 4, without loss of optimality we can restrict attention
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to coordination strategies of the form
γt = ψt(Πt), t = 1, . . . , T. (4.24)
Further, we can write a dynamic program for the coordinator as follows: For any
PMF pi on the Q× U1 × . . .× UT−1, define
JT (pi) = sup
γ˜T
E{R˜(ΠT+1)|ΠT = pi, γT = γ˜T}
= sup
γ˜T
E{R˜(FT+1(pi, γ˜T ))|ΠT = pi, γT = γ˜T}
= sup
γ˜T
R˜(FT+1(pi, γ˜T )) (4.25)
For t = 1, . . . , T − 1, and for any PMF pi on the Q× U1 × . . .× Ut−1, define
Jt(pi) = sup
γ˜t
E{Jt+1(Πt+1)|Πt = pi, γt = γ˜t}
= sup
γ˜t
E{Jt+1(Ft+1(pi, γ˜t, Zt+1))|Πt = pi, γt = γ˜t} (4.26)
The arg sup γ∗t in the RHS of (4.26) is the optimal action for the coordinator at time




Proof. From Proposition IV.11, we conclude that the optimization problem for the
coordinator is to control the evolution of the controlled Markov process {Πt, t =
1, 2, . . . , T} by selecting the partial functions {γt, t = 1, 2, . . . , T} in order to maximize
E{R˜(ΠT+1)}.
Thus, the coordinator’s optimization problem can be viewed as a Markov decision
problem with Πt as the state of the Markov process. The structural result and the
dynamic program follow from standard results in Markov decision theory [Kumar and
Varaiya (1986a)].
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Theorem IV.12 provides a sequential decomposition to find the optimal coordina-
tion strategy in Problem 4. Because of the equivalence between Problems 4 and 3,
optimal decision strategies in Problem 3 can be constructed from an optimal coordi-
nation strategy. Thus, we have the following result:
Theorem IV.13. In Problem 3, without loss of optimality we can restrict attention
to decision strategies of the form
Ut = gt(Pt,Πt), t = 1, . . . , T, (4.27)
where
Πt(q, u1, . . . , ut−1) := Pg1:t−1(Q = q, U1 = u1, . . . , Ut−1 = ut−1|Ct).
Further, the optimal strategy at time t ,g∗t , is related to the arg sup γ
∗
t in the RHS of
Jt(pi) in Theorem IV.12 (equation (4.26)) as follows:
g∗t (·, pi) = γ∗t
4.2 Two Important Special Cases
The previous section establishes the role of common information in finding sequen-
tial decompositions for general sequential decision making problems. The fictitious
coordinator approach allows us to sequentially find prescriptions for decision makers
that map their private information to their decision. In the following two sections, we
will specialize our results to two specific cases. The two cases present two extremes
of information structures: in the first case, all information of the tth decision maker
is private and not shared with any future decision maker while in the second case all
information of the tth decision maker is shared with all future decision makers. The
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second case is also commonly known as the case of perfect recall in stochastic control
problems.
4.2.1 No Common Information
In this section, we specialize the results of Section 4.1 to the case when there is
no common information at any time t < T . That is, we have
Ct = ∩k≥tIk = ∅,
for t < T . This has the following implications for t < T :
1. Pt = It \ Ct = It
2. Zt+1 = Ct+1 \ Ct = ∅.
3. The coordinator’s partial decision rule maps private information to decision.
Since, in this case, all information is private, we have that γt : It 7→ Ut. In
other words, the coordinator’s partial decision rule is in fact the actual decision
rule for the tth decision-maker. Because of this, we will replace γt by our usual
notation for decision rule gt.
4. In absence of any common information, the coordinator selects gt as
gt = ψt(g1:t−1)
Thus, under any given coordination strategy ψt, the sequence of decision rules
gt, 1 ≤ t ≤ T is a deterministic sequence.
5. In absence of common information, Proposition IV.10 implies that the coordi-
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nator’s information states
Πt = P(Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut−1 = ut−1|g1:t−1),
evolve deterministically as: Πt+1 = Ft+1(Πt, gt).
Note that at the final time, CT = ∩k≥T Ik = IT , thus PT = ∅ and the prescription
from the coordinator is the decision for the T th decision maker.
The result of Theorem IV.12 gives us the following sequential decomposition for
this case
Theorem IV.14. In Problem 3 with no common information at any time, we can
restrict attention to coordination strategies of the form
gt = ψt(Πt), t = 1, . . . , T − 1, (4.28)
and
UT = ψT (ΠT ). (4.29)
Further, we can write a dynamic program for the coordinator as follows: For any
PMF pi on the Q× U1 × . . .× UT−1, define
JT (pi) = sup
uT
R˜(FT+1(pi, uT )) (4.30)
For t = 1, . . . , T − 1, and for any PMF pi on the Q× U1 × . . .× Ut−1, define
Jt(pi) = sup
gt










The dynamic program in Theorem IV.14 provides a sequential decomposition
for the problem of finding an optimal decision strategies in the sequential decision
making problem with no common information at any time. In absence of common
information, the coordinator’s problem is to choose decision strategies g1, g2, . . . , gT .
The dynamic program of Theorem IV.14 provides a backward inductive method of
finding an optimal strategy where at each step the coordinator selects an optimal
decision rule g∗t given that the future strategies are chosen optimally. In its essence,
this sequential decomposition is identical to the designer’s approach first described
in Witsenhausen (1973). Thus, in absence of common information, the coordinator’s
approach described in this chapter is identical to the designer’s approach suggested
in Witsenhausen (1973).
In all sequential problems, the designer’s approach will result in a deterministic
dynamic program where the optimization at each step is over the space of decision
rules. In the next section, we consider a case where the coordinator’s approach based
on common information results in a dynamic program that is stochastic and in which
the optimization at each step is over the space of decisions.
4.2.2 No Private Information: The Case of Perfect Recall
In this section, we specialize the results of Section 4.1 to the case when there is
no private information at any time t. This happens if we have for all t = 1, ..T ,
Ct = ∩k≥tIk = It (4.32)
which implies that
Pt = It \ Ct = ∅ (4.33)
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Remark IV.15 (Perfect Recall). A direct implication of equation (4.32) is that It ⊂ Ik,
∀k > t. That is, all decision makers that act after time t “remember” the information
available to the tth decision maker. Since this holds for all t, we have that the kth
decision maker has all the information of all preceding decision makers. That is,
I1 ⊂ I2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Ik ⊂ · · · ⊂ IT (4.34)
This is commonly referred to as the condition of perfect recall in sequential decision
making problems. For decision problems with perfect recall, classical dynamic pro-
gram provide a sequential decomposition where at each time step the optimization is
over the space of decisions [Bertsekas (1976)].
We can now conclude the following from equations (4.32) and (4.33):
1. As mentioned earlier, the coordinator’s decision is a prescription to the tth
decision maker informing it on how to use its private information to make its
decision. In the case where there is no private information, the prescription from
the coordinator will simply be the decision for the tth decision maker. In other
words, the coordinator’s partial decision rule is in fact the actual decision for
the tth decision-maker. Because of this, we will replace γt by our usual notation
for decision Ut.
2. The coordinator selects Ut as
Ut = ψt(Ct, U1:t−1) = ψt(It, U1:t−1)
3. Further, the coordinator’s information states are
Πt = P(Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut−1 = ut−1|Ct, U1:t−1)
= P(Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut−1 = ut−1|It, U1:t−1) (4.35)
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4. Replacing γt by Ut in propositions IV.10 and IV.11 give us the following results:
For t = 1, . . . , T − 1, there exists functions Ft (which do not depend on the
coordinator’s strategy) such that
Πt+1 = Ft+1(Πt, Ut, Zt+1), (4.36)
where Zt+1 = Ct+1 \ Ct. Also, there exists functions FT+1 (which does not
depend on the coordinator’s strategy) such that
ΠT+1 = FT+1(ΠT , UT ). (4.37)
Further, Πt, t = 1, 2, . . . , T + 1 is a controlled Markov chain with Ut as the
control actions.
With the above implications, the result of Theorem IV.12 can be specialized to
give the following sequential decomposition for this case.
Theorem IV.16. In Problem 3 with no private information at any time, we can
restrict attention to decision strategies of the form
Ut = ψt(Πt), t = 1, . . . , T. (4.38)
Further, we can write a dynamic program for the coordinator as follows: For any
PMF pi on the Q× U1 × . . .× UT−1, define
JT (pi) = sup
uT
R˜(FT+1(pi, uT )) (4.39)
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For t = 1, . . . , T − 1, and for any PMF pi on the Q× U1 × . . .× Ut−1, define
Jt(pi) = sup
ut
E{Jt+1(Πt+1)|Πt = pi, Ut = ut}
= sup
ut
E{Jt+1(Ft+1(pi, ut, Zt+1))|Πt = pi, Ut = ut} (4.40)





The dynamic program of Theorem IV.16 is identical to the classical dynamic
program of sequential decision problems of classical information structure. At the
final time, the decision maker selects a decision that is optimal with respect to its
belief on the primitive random variables and past actions. (In this case, the past
actions are known exactly.) Then, proceeding backwards, at time t, the decision
maker selects a decision optimal to its current belief on primitive random variables
and past actions assuming that the future decisions will be chosen optimally given its
current decision. Thus, when all information is common, the coordinator’s approach
described in this chapter is identical to the classical backward inductive dynamic
program.
4.3 Conclusion
In this Chapter, we presented a general model of sequential decision making prob-
lem and derived a sequential decomposition of the problem of finding optimal strate-
gies based on the common information methodology. This result shows the universal
applicability of the common information idea to sequential decision making prob-
lems. We also showed that our sequential decomposition unifies the separate results
of dynamic programming in classical information structures and the designer based
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sequential decompositions of Witsenhausen (1973) for non-classical information struc-




Common Information and the Notion of State
The result of Chapter IV provides a sequential decomposition for any sequential
problem. The information state for this sequential decomposition is a probability
distribution on all primitive random variables and preceding decisions con-
ditioned on the common information. In terms of the coordinator’s perspective
that we used to obtain that result, we require that at any time t, the coordinator
forms a belief on all relevant system variables that have been realized so far. The
question we want to address in this chapter is the following: When can we simplify
the information state for sequential decomposition? In other words, are there cases
when the coordinator does not need to form a belief on all system variables?
Our approach for simplifying the coordinator’s information state is to use the
concept of state. In broad terms, a state is a summary of past data that is sufficient
for an input-output description of the system from the coordinator’s point of view.
What is the past data? At time t, clearly the decisions made before time t are a part
of past data. But what about the primitive random variables? In our general model
of a sequential problem, we did not assume any temporal order in the realization of
the primitive random variables. In order to develop the concept of state, we will now
impose a temporal order on the primitive random variables. That is, we will classify
the primitive random variables into sub-groups each of which is realized at a different
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time instant. With this modification, we can exactly identify the primitive random
variables that are part of the past data at time t - these are simply the variables
realized before the decision is made at time t.
In general, there is no algorithmic way of identifying a state sufficient for input-
output map from the coordinator’s perspective. Instead, we will present sufficient
conditions for a function of past data to be a state sufficient for the coordinator’s
input-output map. We will show that when these conditions are met, we can simplify
the information state for the coordinator. Instead of a posterior on all past data, the
coordinator would only need a posterior on the state sufficient for input-output map
as its information state.
Organization: The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, we
present a modified model of sequential decision making problems with a temporal or-
der on the primitive random variables. In Section 5.2, we present sufficient conditions
for a function of past data to be a state sufficient for coordinator’s input-output map
and provide a simplified sequential decomposition when such a state can be found.
We finally consider the special cases of partially observable Markov decision problems
and a two agent team problem in Section 5.3.
5.1 The Model
We modify the model in Section 4.1.1 of Chapter Chapter IV to introduce a
temporal order in the realization of primitive random variables. The model we now
study consists of the following components:
Components of a Sequential Decision Making Problem:
1. A finite probability space (Ω,B,P).
2. Primitive Random Variables: A collection Q = {Q1, Q2, . . . , QT} of random
vectors defined on the above probability space. We assume that the primitive
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random variables are selected by nature sequentially. The random vector Qt is
realized at time t just before the tth decision is made. We will assume Qt takes
values in a finite space Qt endowed with the power-set sigma algebra 2Qt .
3. A finite number T of decision-makers (DMs) that make decisions in a pre-
determined sequence.
4. Decision Spaces: For t = 1, 2, . . . , T , (Ut, 2Ut) are finite measurable spaces.
5. Observation Spaces and Observation Maps: For t = 1, 2, . . . , T , Nt is the finite
number of observations available for making the tth decision. We have the
following finite observation space
It = Y1t × Y2t × . . .× YNtt
equipped with the power-set sigma algebra.





t , . . . , h
Nt
t ),
where for each j = 1, 2, . . . , Nt, h
j
t is a measurable map from (Q1 × Q2 . . . ×
Qt×U1×U2× . . .×Ut−1, 2Q1 × . . .× 2Qt × 2U1 × . . .× 2Ut−1) to (Yjt , 2Y
j
t ). Note
that the domain of hjt does not include Qt+1,Qt+2, . . . ,QT .
6. Reward: Let R be a real-valued function defined on the measurable space (Q1×
Q2 × . . .×QT × U1 × U2 × . . .× UT , 2Q × 2U1 × . . .× 2UT ).
7. Decision Strategy Space: Let Gt be the set of all measurable mappings from
(It, 2It) to (Ut, 2Ut) and G = G1 × . . .× GT .
Description of the Decision-Making Problem:
The above components of the sequential decision making problem can be interpreted
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as follows. The information available to the first decision-maker is a random vector
I1 that takes values in the observation space I1. Further, I1 = (Y 11 , Y 21 , . . . , Y N11 ),
where for each j = 1, . . . , N1, Y
j
1 is related to the primitive random vector Q1 via an
observation map hj1. That is,
Y j1 = h
j
1(Q1) (5.1)
The first decision maker uses a decision rule g1 ∈ G1 to map its information to its
decision. Thus,
U1 = g1(I1) (5.2)
Subsequently, the information available to the second decision-maker is a random
vector I2 that takes values in the observation space I2. Further, I2 = (Y 12 , Y 22 , . . . , Y N21 ),
where for each j = 1, . . . , N2, Y
j
2 is related to the primitive random vectors Q1, Q2
and U1 via an observation map h
j
2. That is,
Y j2 = h
j
2(Q1, Q2, U1) (5.3)
The second decision maker uses a decision rule g2 ∈ G2 to map its information to its
decision. Thus,
U2 = g2(I2) (5.4)
Proceeding sequentially, the tth decision-maker’s information is a random vector
It that takes values in the observation space It and is given by the observation maps
Y jt = h
j
t(Q1, Q2, . . . , Qt, U1, U2, . . . , Ut−1), (5.5)
for j = 1, 2, . . . , Nt. Note that the observations of the t
th decision maker depend only
on the primitive random vectors chosen before the tth decision, i.e., Q1, Q2, . . . , Qt.
The tth decision maker uses a decision rule gt ∈ Gt to map its information to its
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decision. Thus,
Ut = gt(It) (5.6)
The collection g = (g1, g2, . . . , gT ) is referred to as a decision strategy profile, while
the function gt is referred to as a decision rule/decision strategy at time t. Given a
choice of decision strategy profile, the decisions U1, U2, . . . UT , the observation vectors
I1, I2, . . . IT as well as the reward R(Q1:T , U1:T ) are well-defined random variables.
The value of a decision strategy g is defined as
J (g) = Eg[R(Q1, Q2, . . . , QT , U1, U2, . . . , UT )] (5.7)
We can now formulate the following problem:
Problem 5. For the model of sequential decision making problems described above,
choose a decision strategy profile g ∈ G in order to maximize the value J (g) given by
equation (5.7).
5.2 The Coordinator’s Input-Output State
Clearly, the model described above is a special case of the sequential decision-
making problems of Chapter IV. Therefore, the information state established for the
coordinator in Theorem IV.12 applies here as well. Our goal in this section is to
find conditions under which the coordinator’s information state can be simplified. To
do so, our approach is to check if we can find a “state description” of the system
when viewed from the coordinator’s perspective. The state we want to find should
be a summary of past data that is sufficient for input-output map as viewed from the
coordinator.
We do not have an algorithmic way of identifying a state sufficient for input-output
map from the coordinator’s perspective. Instead, we will present sufficient conditions
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for a function of past data to be a state sufficient for coordinator’s input-output map.
Thus, in specific instances of the model described above, we will have to guess a
potential state for the coordinator and then use the conditions presented below to
verify if our guess is indeed a true state sufficient for coordinator’s input-output map.
We now present sufficient conditions for a function of past data to be a state
sufficient for the coordinator’s input-output map. (Recall that we denote by Ct
the common information at time t, by Pt the private information at time t and
Zt+1 = Ct+1/Ct.)
Definition V.1 (State Sufficient for the Coordinator’s Input-Output Map). For each
t = 1, 2, . . . , T , let Lt = dt(Q1:t, U1:t−1) be a function of the past primitive random
variables and decisions and let St = (Lt, Pt). We assume Lt takes values in the set
Lt and St takes values in the set St = Lt × Pt. Then, St is a state sufficient for
coordinator’s input-output map if the following two conditions hold:
1. Condition 1: Under any coordination strategy ψ,
Pψ(St+1, Zt+1|Q1:t, U1:t) = P(St+1, Zt+1|St, Ut), (5.8)
where the right hand side of equation (5.8) does not depend on the coordination
strategy ψ.
2. Condition 2: The reward function can be expressed as an accumulated sum
of the form:




5.2.1 A Sequential Decomposition
In this section, we provide a sequential decomposition for the coordinator when
a state sufficient for the coordinator’s input output map (that is, a state satisfying
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Conditions 1 and 2) can be found. The main idea here is that instead of a posterior
probability distribution on all primitive random variables and preceding decisions,
the coordinator can use its posterior belief on the state sufficient for the input-output
map as its information state.
Definition V.2 (Information States). For a coordination strategy ψ, define infor-
mation states Πt, t = 1, 2, . . . , T as
Πt(l, p) := Pψ(Lt = l, Pt = p|Ct, γ1:t−1). (5.9)
Recall, from Chapter IV, that γt is the partial decision rule prescribed by the coordi-
nator to the decision-maker at time t.
The following result shows how the coordinator’s information state evolves de-
pending on its observations and its decisions.
Proposition V.3. For t = 1, . . . , T − 1, there exists functions Ft (which do not
depend on the coordinator’s strategy) such that
Πt+1 = Ft+1(Πt, γt, Zt+1), (5.10)
Proof. See Appendix D.
At t = 1, Π1(l, p) := Pψ(L1 = l, P1 = p|C1). Since L1, P1 and C1 only depend on
the primitive random variables, it follows that the above conditional probability is
independent of the coordinator’s strategy ψ. Thus, Π1 does not depend on the choice
of coordinator’s strategy ψ. Proposition V.3 shows that at t = 2, . . . , T , Πt depends
on the strategy ψ only through the choices of γ1:t−1.
Proposition V.4. The process Πt, t = 1, 2, . . . , T is a controlled Markov chain with
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γt as the control action at time t, i.e.,
Pψ(Πt+1|Ct,Π1:t, γ1:t) = P(Πt+1|Π1:t, γ1:t)
= P(Πt+1|Πt, γt), (5.11)
where the transition probabilities on the right hand side of (5.11) do not depend on
the coordination strategy ψ. Furthermore, there exist deterministic functions R˜t such
that
E{Rt(St, Ut))} = E{R˜t(Πt, γt)}. (5.12)
Proof. See Appendix D.
The controlled Markov property of the process {Πt, t = 1, . . . , T} immediately
gives rise to the following result.
Theorem V.5. In Problem 5, when there exists a state process St as defined in Defi-
nition V.1 and satisfying Conditions 1 and 2, we can restrict attention to coordination
strategies of the form
γt = ψt(Πt), t = 1, . . . , T. (5.13)
without loss of optimality. Further, we can write a dynamic program for the coordi-
nator as follows: For any PMF pi on the Lt × Pt, define
JT (pi) = sup
γ˜T
E{R˜T (ΠT , γT )|ΠT = pi, γT = γ˜T}
= sup
γ˜T
R˜T (pi, γ˜T ) (5.14)
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For t = 1, . . . , T − 1, and for any PMF pi on the Lt × Pt, define
Jt(pi) = sup
γ˜t
E{R˜t(Πt, γt) + Jt+1(Πt+1)|Πt = pi, γt = γ˜t}
= sup
γ˜t
E{R˜t(pi, γ˜t) + Jt+1(Ft+1(pi, γ˜t, Zt+1))|Πt = pi, γt = γ˜t} (5.15)
The arg sup γ∗t in the RHS of Jt(pi) is the optimal action for the coordinator at time




Proof. From Proposition V.4, we conclude that the optimization problem for the
coordinator is to control the evolution of the controlled Markov process {Πt, t =
1, 2, . . . , T} by selecting the partial functions {γt, t = 1, 2, . . . , T} in order to maximize
E{∑Tt=1 R˜t(Πt, γt)}.
Thus, the coordinator’s optimization problem can be viewed as a Markov decision
problem with Πt as the state of the Markov process. The structural result and the
dynamic program follow from standard results in Markov decision theory [Kumar and
Varaiya (1986a)].
The solution of the coordinator’s problem given by Theorem V.5 can be adapted
to the original problem Problem 5 as follows:
Theorem V.6. Consider Problem 5 described in Section 5.1. Suppose there exist a
state process St, t = 1, 2, . . . , T as defined in Definition V.1 and satisfying Condi-
tions 1 and 2. Then, without loss of optimality we can restrict attention to decision
strategies of the form
Ut = gt(Pt,Πt), t = 1, . . . , T, (5.16)
where
Πt(l, p) := Pg1:t−1(Lt = l, Pt = p|Ct).
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Further, the optimal strategy is related to the arg inf γ∗t in the RHS of Jt(pi) in
Theorem V.5 as follows:
g∗t (·, pi) = γ∗t
5.3 Examples
In this Section, we use the result of Theorem V.6 to two special models of sequen-
tial decision making problems. We first consider the well-studied partially observable
Markov decision problem (POMDP) and show that the result of Theorem V.6 spe-
cialize to well-known structural and dynamic programming results for this problem.
We then consider a model of two-agent teams similar to the one studied in Mahajan
(2008) and show that the result of Theorem V.6 are analogous to the sequential decom-
position presented in Mahajan (2008). As in Chapter IV, our common information
methodology shows that the classical results of centralized models like POMDPs and
the sequential decomposition for non-classical team problems both follow from the
same conceptual framework of common information and an input-output
state description for the coordinator who only knows the common information.
5.3.1 Partially Observable Markov Decision Problems
5.3.1.1 The Model
Consider a system consisting of a plant and a controller. At time t = 1, the plant
is in the initial state given by the random variable X1. With time, the plant evolves
according to
Xt+1 = ft(Xt, Ut, Vt) (5.17)
where Vt is a random variable taking values in a finite set V . {Vt; t = 1, . . . , T − 1} is
a sequence of independent random variables that are also independent of X1.
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The controller’s observations are generated according to
Yt = ht(Xt,Wt) (5.18)
whereWt are random variables taking values in a finite setWt. {Wt; t = 1, . . . , T ; } are
independent random variables that are also independent of X1 and {Vt; t = 1, . . . , T}.
The controller must select its action Ut as a function of the form:
Ut = gt(Y1:t, U1:t−1) (5.19)







5.3.1.2 The Input-Output State for the Coordinator
The above decision-making problem can be easily described in terms of the model
of Section 5.1. The primitive random variables are given as Q = {Q1, Q2, . . . , QT}
where Q1 = (X1,W1) and Qt = (Vt−1,Wt), for 1 < t ≤ T . The information available
for making the tth decision is It = (Y1:t, U1:t−1). It is easy to see that in this case, we
have
Ct = ∩k≥tIk = It (5.21)
and
Pt = It \ Ct = ∅
and
Zt+1 = Ct+1 \ Ct = (Yt+1, Ut)
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As mentioned earlier, the coordinator’s decision is a prescription to the tth decision
maker informing it on how to use its private information to make its decision. Since
in this case there is no private information, the prescription from the coordinator will
simply be the decision for the tth decision maker. Because of this, we will replace γt
by our usual notation for decision Ut. The coordinator selects its prescription Ut as
a function of the common information at time t and the past prescriptions. Thus,
Ut = ψt(Ct, U1:t−1) = ψt(It, U1:t−1) = ψt(It)
A Candidate for Input-Output State
As a summary of the past data, we define Lt = Xt. Then, St = (Lt, Pt) = Lt = Xt
(since Pt is empty). With the above definition of St, we can now verify if Conditions
1 and 2 are satisfied.
1. Condition 1:
Pψ(St+1, Zt+1|q1:t, u1:t)
= Pψ(Xt+1, Yt+1, Ut|x1, w1:t, v1:t−1, u1:t)
= 1{Ut=ut}P(Yt+1|Xt+1)Pψ(Xt+1|x1, w1:t, v1:t−1, u1:t, xt) (5.22)
where we added xt in the conditioning in (5.22) since it is a function of the
other terms already fixed in the conditioning. Because of the nature of plant
dynamics and independence of primitive random variables, we can write (5.22)
as
1{Ut=ut}P(Yt+1|Xt+1)P(Xt+1|xt, ut)
= P(Ut, Yt+1, Xt+1|xt, ut)
= P(Zt+1, St+1|st, ut) (5.23)
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2. Condition 2: The reward function trivially satisfies Condition 2.
Since St satisfies Conditions 1 and 2, we can define the coordinator’s information
states as
Πt = P(St|Ct, γ1:t−1)
= P(Xt|Y1:t, U1:t−1) (5.24)
Replacing γt by Ut and Zt+1 by Yt+1, Ut in propositions V.3 and V.4 gives us the
following results:
For t = 1, . . . , T − 1, there exists functions Ft (which do not depend on the coordina-
tor’s strategy) such that
Πt+1 = Ft+1(Πt, Ut, Yt+1), (5.25)
since Yt+1 = Zt+1; and
E{Rt(St, Ut))} = E{R˜t(Πt, Ut)}
Further, Πt, t = 1, 2, . . . , T is a controlled Markov chain with Ut as the control
actions.
With the above results, Theorem V.5 can be specialized to give the following
sequential decomposition for this case.
Theorem V.7. In the partially observable Markov decision problem described in Sec-
tion 5.3.1.1, we can restrict attention to decision strategies of the form
Ut = ψt(Πt), t = 1, . . . , T. (5.26)
Further, we can write a dynamic program for the coordinator as follows: For any
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PMF pi on the ST , define
JT (pi) = sup
uT
R˜T (pi, uT ) (5.27)
For t = 1, . . . , T − 1, and for any PMF pi on the St, define
Jt(pi) = sup
ut
E{R˜t(pi, ut) + Jt+1(Ft+1(pi, ut, Zt+1))|Πt = pi, Ut = ut} (5.28)





The above result is identical to the classical structural and dynamic programming
result for POMDPs [Kumar and Varaiya (1986a)].
5.3.2 A General Two Agent Team Problem
We next consider a general model of two-agent team similar to the model described
in Mahajan (2008). The model consists of a plant and two agents. In the original
model, at each time, Agent 1 takes an action followed by Agent 2. For the ease of
notation in our setup, we will divide each time instant into two sub-time instants
such that Agent 1 acts on odd times and Agent 2 acts on even times. The total time
horizon is thus effectively 2T . Also, unlike the original model of Mahajan (2008), we
will assume memory update rules of each agent (described further below) are fixed.
5.3.2.1 The Model
At time t = 1, the plant is in the initial state given by the random variable X1.
With time, the plant evolves according to
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X2k = X2k−1, (5.29a)
for k = 1, 2, . . . , T and





for k = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1, where V2k is a random variable taking values in a finite set
V . {V2k; k = 1, . . . , T − 1} is a sequence of independent random variables that are
also independent of X1. At each odd time t = 2k − 1, Agent 1 makes an observation
according to
Y 12k−1 = h
1
2k−1(X2k−1,W2k−1) (5.30)
At each even time t = 2k, Agent 2 makes an observation according to





Each agent has a memory that is initialized to 0 (M11 = M
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The agents’ objective is choose g1 := (g11, g
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3, . . . , g
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5.3.2.2 The Input-Output State for the Coordinator
The above decision-making problem can be described in terms of the model of
Section 5.1. The primitive random variables are given as Q = {Q1, Q2, . . . , Q2T}
where Q1 = (X1,W1) and Q2k = W2k and Q2k+1 = (V2k,W2k+1). The information











t−2), if t is even
. It is easy to see that in this case, we have
Ct = ∩k≥tIk = ∅ (5.35)
and
Pt = It \ Ct = It
and
Zt+1 = Ct+1 \ Ct = ∅
Since in this case all information is private, the prescription from the coordinator will
be the decision rule for the tth decision maker. The coordinator selects its prescription
gt as a function of the common information at time t and the past prescriptions. Thus,
gt = ψt(Ct, g1:t−1) = ψt(g1:t−1)
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A Candidate for Input-Output State
For k = 1, 2, . . . , T , we define L2k+1 = (X2k+1,M
2























We can now verify if St, t = 1, 2, ..., 2T , satisfies Conditions 1 and 2:
1. Condition 1: We first focus on t = 2k,
Pψ(S2k+1, Z2k+1|q1:2k, u11, . . . , u12k−1, u22, . . . , u22k)
= Pψ(X2k+1,M22k, Y 12k+1,M12k−1|x1, w1:2k, v2, v4, . . . , v2k−2, u11, . . . , u12k−1, u22, . . . , u22k)
= Pψ
X2k+1,M22k, Y 12k+1,M12k−1
∣∣∣∣∣ x1:2k, w1:2k, v2, v4, . . . , v2k,u11, . . . , u12k−1, u22, . . . , u22k,m12k−1,m22k−2, y22k

(5.36)






2k−2 in the conditioning in (5.36) since they
are function of the primitive random variables and decisions included in the
conditioning terms. Equation (5.36) can then be written as
P(Y 12k+1|X2k+1)P(X2k+1|x2k, u12k−1, u22k)1{M12k−1=m12k−1}1{M22k=d22k(m22k−2,y22k,u22k)}
(5.37)
= P(S2k+1|s2k, u22k) (5.38)
where (5.38) follows from (5.36) and (5.37) since of all the conditioning terms




Also, for t = 2k − 1,
Pψ(S2k, Z2k|q1:2k−1, u11, . . . , u12k−1, u22, . . . , u22k−2)
= Pψ
X2k,M12k−1, U12k−1Y 22k,M22k−2
∣∣∣∣∣ x1, w1:2k−1, v2, v4, . . . , v2k−2,u11, . . . , u12k−1, u22, . . . , u22k−2

= Pψ
X2k,M12k−1, U12k−1Y 22k,M22k−2∣∣∣ x1:2k−1, w1:2k−1, v2, v4, . . . , v2k−2,



















2k−1 in the conditioning in (5.39) since
they are function of the primitive random variables and decisions included in
the conditioning terms. Equation (5.39) can then be written as
P(Y 12k|X2k, u12k−1)P(X2k|x2k−1)1{M12k−1=d12k−1(m12k−3,y12k−1,u12k−1)}1{M22k−2=m22k−2}
(5.40)
= P(S2k|s2k−1, u12k−1) (5.41)
where (5.41) follows from (5.39) and (5.40) since of all the conditioning terms
in (5.39), its simplification in (5.40) only uses those included in s2k−1, u12k−1.
Thus, condition 1 is satisfied at all times t = 1, 2, . . . , 2T .







which is of the form required in Condition 2 with the reward at odd times being
0.
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Since St satisfies Conditions 1 and 2, we can define the coordinator’s information
states as
Πt = P(St|Ct, γ1:t−1)
= P(St|g1:t−1) (5.42)
Replacing γt by gt in propositions V.3 and V.4 gives us the following results:
For t = 1, . . . , 2T − 1, there exists functions Ft (which do not depend on the coordi-
nator’s strategy) such that
Πt+1 = Ft+1(Πt, gt) (5.43)
and for k = 1, 2, . . . , T
E{R2k(S2k, U22k)} = E{R˜2k(Π2k, g22k)}
Further, Πt, t = 1, 2, . . . , T + 1 is a controlled Markov chain with gt as the control
actions.
With the above results, Theorem V.5 can be specialized to give the following
sequential decomposition for this case
Theorem V.8. In the two agent team problem described in Section 5.3.2.1, we can
write a dynamic program for the coordinator as follows: For any PMF pi on ST , define

















2k) + J2k+1(F2k+1(pi, g
2
2k))] (5.46)
The arg sup in the RHS of Jt(pi) is the optimal decision at time t when Πt = pi.
Theorem V.8 provides a sequential decomposition of a two-agent team problem
that is similar to the sequential decomposition of Mahajan (2008).
5.4 Other Simplifications of the Coordinator’s Problem
In the preceding sections, we identified conditions under which the coordinator
can simplify its information state. We now focus on another aspect of simplifying the
coordinator’s dynamic program. Recall that at each time t, the coordinator selects
a partial decision rule γt that maps private information at time t to decision at time
t. The optimal choice of γt must be chosen from the set of all functions from the
space of private information Pt to space of decisions Ut. Let Γ(Pt,Ut) be the set of
all functions from Pt to Ut. The size of the set Γ(Pt,Ut) is a natural measure of
the complexity of the coordinator’s optimization problem at each step of its dynamic
program. One way to simplify the coordinator’s optimization is to characterize a set
A ⊂ Γ(Pt,Ut) for which we can guarantee that there always exists an optimal choice
of coordinator’s decision in the set A. We state, without proof, the following lemma
that provides sufficient conditions for one such characterization.
Lemma V.9. Consider a sequential decision making problem of the form described
in Section 5.1. For t = 1, 2, . . . , T , let P ′t ⊂ Pt, such that the following conditions
hold:
1. For any choice of decision strategies g1:T−1 of the form Ut = gt(Pt, Ct), 1 ≤ t ≤
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T − 1, and for all u ∈ UT
E[R(Q1:T , U1:T )|pT , cT , UT = u] = E[R(Q1:T , U1:T )|p′T , cT , UT = u] (5.47)
where pT , p
′
T , cT are any realizations of PT , P
′
T , CT that occur with non-zero prob-
ability;
2. For any choice of decision strategies g1:t−1 of the form Uk = gk(Pk, Ck), 1 ≤
k ≤ t − 1, and gt+1:T of the form Uk = gk(P ′k, Ck), t + 1 ≤ k ≤ T and for all
u ∈ UT
E[R(Q1:T , U1:T )|pt, ct, Ut = u] = E[R(Q1:T , U1:T )|p′t, ct, Ut = u] (5.48)
where pt, p
′
t, ct are any realizations of Pt, P
′
t , Ct that occur with non-zero proba-
bility.
Then, there exist optimal decision strategies of the form Ut = gt(P
′
t , Ct), for all t =
1, 2, . . . , T . In particular, the coordinator can select its partial decision rule from
Γ(P ′t,Ut) ⊂ Γ(Pt,Ut) without losing optimality.
5.5 Conclusions
In this Chapter, we used the concept of state to simplify the common information
based sequential decomposition described in Chapter IV. In broad terms, a state is a
summary of past data that is sufficient for an input-output description of the system
from the point of view of a coordinator that knows the common information. We
identified sufficient conditions for a function of past data to be a state sufficient for the
coordinator’s input output map. We obtained a simplified sequential decomposition
for the coordinator when such a state exists. We re-derived sequential decompositions
of POMDP and a general two-agent team problem by identifying a suitable state for
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In this thesis, we studied sequential decision making problems in cooperative sys-
tems where different agents with different information want to achieve a common
objective. The sequential nature of the decision problem implies that all decisions
can be arranged in a sequence such that the information available to make the tth
decision only depends on preceding decisions. Markov decision theory provides tools
for addressing sequential decision making problems with classical information struc-
tures. In this thesis, we focused on decision making problems with non-classical
information structures. We introduced a new approach for such decision making
problems. This approach relies on the idea of common information among decision-
makers. Intuitively, common information consists of past observations and decisions
that are commonly known to the current and future decision makers. We showed
that a common information based approach can allow us to discover new structural
results of optimal decision strategies; and provide simpler sequential decomposition
of the decision-making problems than earlier approaches. We first demonstrated
this approach on two specific instances of sequential problems, namely, a real-time
multi-terminal communication system and a decentralized control system with de-
layed sharing of information. We then showed that the common information method-
ology applies more generally to any sequential decision making problem. Moreover,
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we showed that our common information methodology unifies the separate sequential
decomposition results available for classical and non-classical information structures.
We also presented sufficient conditions for simplifying common information based se-
quential decompositions using the concept of state sufficient for the input output map
of a coordinator that only knows the common information.
6.1 Common Knowledge and Common Information
The central question in decentralized decision making in cooperative systems is one
of coordination. How can two (or more) agents with different information coordinate
their decisions to achieve the best performance? For effective coordination, an agent
needs to infer what other agents know about the system, what other agents know
about what it knows about the system, what other agents know about what it knows
about their knowledge about the system and so on. Common knowledge, as defined
in Aumann (1976), describes the knowledge that all agents know, that all agents
know that all agents know it and all agents know that all agents know that all agents
know it and so on. The above self-referential verbal logic is expressed much easily
mathematically: if two agents’ knowledge is identified with sigma algebras F and
G, then the common knowledge is simply F ∩ G. Now consider two agents that





Then, one can identify Agent 1’s knowledge with the sigma field σ(X, Y ) ⊂ F and
Agent 2’s knowledge with the sigma field σ(Y, Z) ⊂ F . Then, the common knowledge
between the agents is σ(X, Y )∩σ(Y, Z). Note that the common information between
the agents (as per our definition) is simply the observation Y . Clearly, σ(Y ) ⊂
140
σ(X, Y )∩σ(Y, Z). Thus, common information describes a part of common knowledge
between the agents. Although, common information may capture only a part of
the entire common knowledge, describing common information is much simpler than
describing the entire common knowledge.
In the above example, all observations were primitive random variables. Hence,
one could define agents’ knowledge and the common knowledge without specifying
any decision strategy. In more general problems, an agent’s observation depends on
other agents decisions. For example, the observation Z in the above example could be
a function of primitive random variable and the decision U1 of agent 1. In this case,
Z is well-defined as a random variable only if a decision strategy of agent 1 has been
specified. If g1 is the strategy of agent 1, then one may define agent 2’s knowledge
as σg1(Y, Z) ⊂ F , where we include g1 in the superscript to denote the dependence
of this sub-sigma field on the choice of strategy g1. Thus, the common knowledge
between two agents depends, in general, on the choice of strategies. Note, however,
we can define common information without specifying any decision strategies.
6.2 Common Information and Decision Strategies
The goal of any decision problem is to identify optimal decision strategies for all
agents. Each decision strategy is a complete prescription of an agent’s behavior for
all possible realizations of its information. A common information methodology is
essentially a way of dividing the problem of finding behavioral prescriptions into sub-
problems. When all agents observe the realization of the common information, they
only need prescriptions for the commonly known realization of common information
and prescriptions for unobserved realizations of common information are inconsequen-
tial.
Consider again a sequential problem with two agents where agent 1 observes the
primitive random variables X and Y and agent 2 observes the primitive random vari-
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ables Y and Z. The two agents are required to make decisions U1 ∈ U1 and U2 ∈ U2
respectively in order to maximize the expected value of a reward R(X, Y, Z, U1, U2).
Assume that the primitive random variables X, Y, Z take values in finite sets X ,Y ,Z
respectively. Then, in order to find the best strategy profile, one has to search from
N := |U1||X ||Y|×|U2||Y||Z| possible strategy profiles for this decision problem. Consider
now a common information based approach. For each realization of common infor-
mation Y , we only need to find how agents use their information given the realization
of Y . Thus, to find the best prescription for the given realization of Y , we need to
search from n = |U1||X | × |U2||Z| possible choices. Since, we need prescriptions for
all realizations of Y , the complexity of this approach is roughly |Y| · |U1||X | × |U2||Z|.
This is a considerable improvement from the complexity of a brute force search over
N choices of strategy profiles.
In the above simple example, the second agent’s observation did not depend on the
first agent’s decision. This is not the case in more general forms of decision problems.
In problems where second agent’s observation depends on the decision of the first
agent, there is a communication aspect in the decision problem. This is because the
first agent may try to convey some information to the second agent by means of
its decision. In order for agent 2 to interpret what information agent 1 is trying to
convey, agent 2 needs to know how agent 1 maps information to decision, that is,
agent 2 needs to know the decision strategy of agent 1. This communication aspect
of decision problems has been identified as the reason that sequential decompositions
based on designer’s approach result in optimization over strategy space [Mahajan
(2008)].
Consider again a two agent problem where agent 1 observes the primitive random
variables X, Y . Agent 1 has to make a decision U1 = g1(X, Y ) according to a decision
strategy g1. Agent 2 observes the primitive random variable Y and the decision of
agent 1, U1. Agent 2 must make a decision U2 in order to maximize the expected value
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of a reward R(X, Y, U2). Consider a sequential decomposition based on designer’s
approach. Proceeding backwards, the designer needs to start with specifying agent 2’s
strategy. What should agent 2 do if it observes a realization y, u1 of its observations?
In order to find agent 2’s best decision, the designer must know how can agent 2
interpret u1. That is, the designer needs to know what values of agent 1’s observations
X, Y could have led to the observed decision. In other words, the designer needs to
know the decision strategy g1. This is the main reason why the designer’s sequential
decomposition always involve optimization over strategies.
Consider now a common information based approach for the above problem. Given
a realization y of the common information Y , agent 2 only needs to know what
values of agent 1’s observation X along with the observed realization y of common
information could have led to the observed decision u1. That is, agent 2 only needs
to know the partial decision strategy g(·, y) to interpret agent 1’s decision. This is
one of the main reasons why common information based sequential decompositions
involve optimization over partial decision strategies. Thus, the common information
methodology simplifies the communication aspect of decision problems.
6.3 Future Directions
The common information methodology developed in this thesis relies only on
the sequentiality of decision-making problems. This suggests that this approach can
be used to address a wide class of decision-making problems- especially those with
substantial common information. The delayed sharing information structure is an
example of decentralized control problem where the system architecture (that is, the
sharing of information over a communication medium with delay) introduces common
information among decision-makers. Other kinds of information sharing mechanisms
in decentralized control - namely, sharing of control actions, periodic sharing of infor-
mation, sharing with random delay- also result in the presence of common informa-
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tion among controllers. Thus, we expect that the common information methodology
should be able to provide structural results and sequential decompositions for decen-
tralized control problems with the above mentioned information sharing mechanisms.
In Chapter V, (Section 5.4), we presented one way of simplifying the coordinator’s
sequential decomposition. Essentially, this approach relied on removing redundant
private information from decision-makers’ information. Lesser the private informa-
tion, the simpler are the prescriptions that the coordinator has to find. Another way
of reducing private information can be to make it common information. Can we add
redundant information to a decision-maker’s information so as to have more common
information? Consider a simple two-stage decision problem as an example. DM1 ob-
serves a random variable X1, takes an action U1, DM 2 observes X2 = X1 +U1 +W1,
where W1 is a random variable independent of X1. DM 2 takes an action U2 and
a reward R(X2, U2) is received. Is there common information at time t = 1? No,
since X1 is unavailable to DM 2. However, it is possible to show that even if X1 were
available to DM 2, it will not alter the optimal decision strategy for DM 2. Thus,
as far as DM 2 is concerned, X1 is a redundant observation. Adding this redundant
observation to DM 2, however, allows us to have X1 as common information at time
t = 1. This implies that the coordinator’s prescription at time t = 1 can now simply
be a decision (since there is no private information). Finding appropriate redundant
information that may be added or removed from a decision-makers information in
order to simplify the coordinator’s problem seems to require guesswork and ingenu-
ity, although the work in Mahajan and Tatikonda (2009) suggests an automated way
may be possible.
In general, having more information as common information among decision-
makers can provide improvements in performance. If a group of decision-makers
have more information as common information, they will do no worse than in the
case where they had less common information. Moreover, having more information
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as common implies lesser private information which results in a simpler problem for
the coordinator. If the amount of information that should be common can be altered
(say, by a system designer), how can we decide how much information should be com-
mon information? In other words, can we assess different information structures in
terms of the cost of making more information common versus the benefit of enhanced
performance and simpler solutions?
Finally, in this thesis we developed the common information methodology only for
decision-making problems where all agents have the same objective. The cooperative
nature of the problem is essential for this methodology. When the fictitious coor-
dinator makes its prescriptions, the cooperative nature of the problem ensures that
all agents have no reason to deviate from the prescribed behavior. This is clearly
not the case in game-theoretic problems where different agents may have different
objectives. Can common information methodology have any role to play in game-
theoretic problems? We believe the answer is yes. Using the fact that all agents have
some information in common may simplify the problem of finding equilibrium deci-
sion strategies. Instead of finding decision strategies that are in Nash equilibrium,
we expect that one may be able to simplify the problem to finding partial decision
strategies that are in Nash equilibrium for each realization of common information.
We hope the above questions will provide useful starting points in future efforts to





Appendix for Multi-Terminal Communication
System
Proof of Lemma II.4
For a realization x11:t of X
1
1:t, we have by definition,
b1t (a) =P (A = a|x11:t)
=P (A = a, x1t |x11:t−1)/
∑
a′∈A
P (A = a′, x1t |x11:t−1) (A.1)
where we used Bayes’ rule in (A.1). The numerator in (A.1) can be written as,
P (X1t = x
1
t |A = a, x11:t−1).P (A = a|x11:t−1)
=P (X1t = x
1
t |A = a, x1t−1).b1t−1(a) (A.2)
where we used the Markov nature of X1t when conditioned on A. Thus, for a fixed a,
the numerator in (A.1) depends only on x1t , x
1














where α1t , t = 2, 3, ..., T are deterministic transformations.
Proof of Lemma II.5
By definition of µ1t , we have
µ1t (m) = P (M
1





t−1) = m|Z11:t−1, l11:t−1) (A.3)
With the memory update rules l11:t−1 fixed, the probability in (A.3) can be evaluated
from the conditional distribution P (M1t−2, Y
1
t−1|Z11:t−1, l11:t−1). For m′ ∈ M1 and y ∈
Y1, this conditional distribution is given as
P (M1t−2 = m
′, Y 1t−1 = y|Z11:t−1, l11:t−1) (A.4)
=P (Y 1t−1 = y|M1t−2 = m′, Z11:t−1, l11:t−1)×
P (M1t−2 = m
′|Z11:t−1, l11:t−1)
=P (Y 1t−1 = y|Z1t−1).P (M1t−2 = m′|Z11:t−2, l11:t−2) (A.5)
=P (Y 1t−1 = y|Z1t−1).µ1t−1(m′) (A.6)
where we used the fact that the channel noise at time t (N1t ) is independent of the
past noise variables and the Markov source in (A.5). Thus, we only need Z1t−1 and
µ1t−1 to form the joint belief in (A.4). Consequently, we can evaluate µ
1












where β1t , t = 2, 3, ..., T are deterministic transformations.
Proof Of Lemma II.13





partial encoding functions w˜11:t, the receiver’s belief on the state of the source at time
t is given as:
ψt(x) := P (Xt = x|z11:t, z21:t, w˜11:t, f 21:t) (A.7)
where x = (x1, x2, a). Using Bayes’ rule, we have




1:t|z11:t, w˜11:t, f 21:t)/∑
x′∈X
P (Xt = x
′, Z21:t = z
2
1:t|z11:t, w˜11:t, f 21:t) (A.8)
The numerator in right hand side of (A.8) can be written as
P (Z21:t = z
2
1:t|z11:t, Xt = x, w˜11:t, f 21:t)
× P (Xt = x|z11:t, w˜11:t, f 21:t)
=P (Z21:t = z
2
1:t|X2t = x2, A = a, f 21:t)
× P (X2t = x2|A = a)× P (X1t = x1t , A = a|z11:t, w˜11:t) (A.9)






t given A for the first




t , A) in the second term of left hand side
of (A.9).
Since the second encoder is fixed, the first term in the right hand side of (A.9) is
a known statistic which depends on z21:t. The second term is again a known source
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statistic. Consider the last term in (A.9). It can be expressed as follows:
∑
b′∈∆(A)
P (X1t = x
1







[P (A = a|b1t = b′, x1t , z11:t, w˜11:t)








b′(a)× ξ˜1t (x1t , b′) (A.11)
Similar representations also hold for each term in the denominator of (A.8). It follows
then that with a fixed f 21:t, ψt(x) depends only on the realization of second encoder’s
messages Z21:t and ξ
1
t . Thus, from (A.9) and (A.11), we conclude that ψt can be
evaluated from ξ1t and Z
2
1:t by means of deterministic transformations. We will call












Proof of Lemma II.14
1) Consider a realization z11:t and w˜
1
1:t.













t |z11:t, w˜11:t) (A.13)
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P (X1t = x
′, b1t = b
′, Z1t = z
1
t |z11:t−1, w˜11:t) (A.14)
We can write the numerator as:
P (Z1t = z
1
t |X1t = x1t , b1t = b˜1t , z11:t−1, w˜11:t)
× P (X1t = x1t , b1t = b˜1t |z11:t−1, w˜11:t)
= P (Z1t = z
1
t |X1t = x1t , b1t = b˜1t , w˜1t )
× P (X1t = x1t , b1t = b˜1t |z11:t−1, w˜11:t) (A.15)
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t ). The second term in (A.15) can
























[P (b1t = b˜
1
t |b1t−1 = b′, X1t = x1t , X1t−1 = x′′)
× P (X1t = x1t |A = a,X1t−1 = x′′)











[P (b1t = b˜
1
t |b1t−1 = b′, X1t = x1t , X1t−1 = x′′)
× P (X1t = x1t |A = a,X1t−1 = x′′)
× P (A = a|b1t−1 = b′)× ξ˜1t−1(x′′, b′)] (A.17)
where we used Lemma II.4 and the Markov property of X1t given A in (A.16). The





and X1t−1. The second term is a known source statistic and the third term is b
′(a).
Similar expressions hold for the denominator in (A.14). Thus, from (A.14)-(A.17),












2) With encoder 2’s strategy fixed, the expected instantaneous cost from the
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coordinator’s perspective is given as:
E{ρt(Xt, Xˆt)|z11:t, w˜11:t}
=E{ρt(X1t , X2t , A, τt(δt(ξ1t , Z21:t)))|z11:t, w˜11:t, ξ˜1t }, (A.18)




1:t, hence it can be included in the conditioning vari-
ables. Thus, the only random variables in the above expectation are X1t , X
2
t , A and
Z21:t. Therefore, the above expectation is a function of the following probability mass
function:










1:t|z11:t, w˜11:t, ξ˜1t )






t |A = a,X1t = x1t , z11:t, w˜11:t, ξ˜1t )
× P (X1t = x1t , A = a|z11:t, w˜11:t, ξ˜1t )






t |A = a)×∑
b′∈∆(A)
[P (X1t = x
1
t , A = a, b
1
t = b
′|z11:t, w˜11:t, ξ˜1t )]






t |A = a)×∑
b′∈∆(A)
[P (A = a|b1t = b′, z11:t, w˜11:t, ξ˜1t ) (A.19)
× P (X1t = x1t , b1t = b′|z11:t, w˜11:t, ξ˜1t )]










× P (X1t = x1t , b1t = b′|z11:t, w˜11:t, ξ˜1t )]










× ξ˜1t (x1t , b′)] (A.20)
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where we used conditional independence of the encoder’s observations and actions
given A in (A.19). In (A.20), the first term is a fixed statistic when encoder 2’s
strategy is fixed and the second term depends only on ξ˜1t . Thus, the expectation in




Appendix for Delayed Sharing Information
Structures
Proof of Proposition III.4
Fix a coordinator strategy ψ. Consider a realization ct+1 of the common in-




1:t) be the corresponding realization of partial functions




1:t) has non-zero probability.
Then, the realization pit+1 of Πt+1 is given by
pit+1(st+1) = Pψ(St+1 = st+1|ct+1, γ˜11:t, γ˜21:t). (B.1)














· P(Vt = vt) · P(W 1t+1 = w1t+1)
· P(W 2t+1 = w2t+1) · Pψ(St = st|ct+1, γ˜11:t, γ˜21:t). (B.2)
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Since ct+1 = (ct, zt+1), the last term of (B.2) can be written as
Pψ(St = st|ct, zt+1, γ˜11:t, γ˜21:t)
=
Pψ(St = st, Zt+1 = zt+1|ct, γ˜11:t, γ˜21:t)∑
s′ Pψ(St = s′, Zt+1 = zt+1|ct, γ˜11:t, γ˜21:t)
. (B.3)
Use (3.20) and the sequential order in which the system variables are generated
to write
Pψ(St = st, Zt+1 = zt+1|ct, γ˜11:t, γ˜21:t)
= 1hˆt(st)(zt+1) · Pψ(St = st|ct, γ˜11:t−1, γ˜21:t−1) (B.4)
= 1hˆt(st)(zt+1) · pit(st). (B.5)
where γ˜1t , γ˜
2
t are dropped from conditioning in (B.4) because for the given coordina-
tor’s strategy, they are functions of the rest of the terms in the conditioning. Substi-
tute (B.5), (B.3), and (B.2) into (B.1), to get





where Ft+1(·) is given by (B.1), (B.2), (B.3), and (B.5).
Proof of Proposition III.5
Fix a coordinator strategy ψ. Consider a realization ct+1 of the common in-










1:t) has a non-zero probability. Then, for any Borel subset A ⊂ P{S},
where P{S} is the space of probability mass functions over the finite set S (the space
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of realization of St), use Proposition III.4 to write









· P(Zt+1 = zt+1|ct, pi1:t, γ˜11:t, γ˜21:t) (B.6)
Now, use (3.20), to obtain








1hˆt(st)(zt+1) · pit(st) (B.7)




1:t) of positive probabil-
ity, the conditional probability P(St = st|ct, pi1:t, γ˜11:t, γ˜21:t) is same as pit(st). Substi-
tute (B.7) back in (B.6), to get











· 1hˆt(st)(zt+1) · pit(st)
= P(Πt+1 ∈ A|pit, γ˜1t , γ˜2t ), (B.8)
thereby proving (3.24).
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Now, use Proposition III.2 to write,



















· P(Vt = vt) · P(W 1t+1 = w1t+1) · P(W 2t+1 = w2t+1)



















· P(Vt = vt) · P(W 1t+1 = w1t+1)







Piecewise linearity and concavity of value function
Lemma B.1. For any realization γ˜1:2t of γ
1:2





















· P(Vt = vt) · P(W 1:2t+1 = w1:2t+1) · pit(st)
where the summation is over all realizations of (st, vt, w
1:2






We prove the piecewise linearity and concavity of the value function by induction.
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For t = T ,







Lemma B.1 implies that JT (pi) is the inifimum of finitely many linear functions of pi.
Thus, JT (pi) is piecewise linear and concave in pi. This forms the basis of induction.
Now assume that Jt+1(pi) is piecewise linear and concave in pi. Then, Jt+1 can be





ai(s) · pi(s) + bi
}
, (B.10)
where ai(s), bi, i ∈ I, s ∈ S are real numbers. Using this, we will prove that the





1, γ˜2) + E{Jt+1(Πt+1)|Πt = pi, γ1:2t = γ˜1:2}
]
. (B.11)
For a particular choice of γ˜1:2, we concentrate on the terms inside the square brackets.
By Lemma B.1 the first term is linear in pi. The second term can be written as















ai(s) · (Ft+1(pi, γ˜1, γ˜2, zt+1))(s) + bi
}
· P(Zt+1 = zt+1|Πt = pi, γ1:2t = γ˜1:2)
]
(B.13)
where the last expression follows from (B.10).
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Note that
P(Zt+1 = zt+1|Πt = pi, γ1:2t = γ˜1:2) =
∑
s′∈S
1hˆt(s′)(zt+1) · pi(s′) (B.14)
Focus on each term in the outer summation in (B.13). For each value of zt+1,













1hˆt(s′)(zt+1) · pi(s′) (B.15)
The second summand is linear in pi. Using the characterization of Ft+1 from the proof



















which is also linear in pi. Substituting (B.15) and (B.16) in (B.13), we get that for
a given choice of γ˜1, γ˜2, the second expectation in (B.11) is concave in pi. Thus, the
value function Jt(pi) is the minimum of finitely many functions each of which is linear
in pi. This implies that Jt is piecewise linear and concave in pi. This completes the
induction argument.
Proof of Proposition III.11
We prove the three parts separately.
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Part 1)







t−n+1) and Ct+1 = (Ct, Zt+1). Fix a coordination strategy ψ
and consider a realization ct+1 of Ct+1. Then,
θt+1(xt−n+1)
:= P(Xt−n+1 = xt−n+1|ct+1)




P(Xt−n+1 = xt−n+1|Xt−n = x, u1:2t−n+1)




P(Xt−n+1 = xt−n+1|Xt−n = x, u1:2t−n+1)





x′ P(Xt−n = x′, y1:2t−n+1, u1:2t−n+1|ct)
(B.17)
Consider the second term of (B.17), and note that under any coordination strategy
ψ, the variables u1:2t−n+1 are deterministic functions of y
1:2
t−n+1 and ct (which is same as
y1:21:t−n, u
1:2
1:t−n). Therefore, the numerator of the second term of (B.17) can be written
as
Pψ(xt−n, y1:2t−n+1, u1:2t−n+1|ct)
= Pψ(u1:2t−n+1|xt−n, y1:2t−n+1, ct)
· Pψ(y1:2t−n+1|xt−n, ct) · Pψ(xt−n|ct)
= Pψ(u1:2t−n+1|y1:2t−n+1, ct)
· P(y1:2t−n+1|xt−n) · θt(xt−n) (B.18)
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Substitute (B.18) in (B.17) and cancel Pψ(u1:2t−n+1|y1:2t−n+1, ct) from the numerator and
denominator. Thus, θt+1 is a function of θt and zt+1.
Next we prove that rkt+1 is a function of r
k
t , Zt+1 and γ
k
t . Recall that
rkt+1 := (r
k
m,(t+1), t− n+ 2 ≤ m ≤ t).
We prove the result by showing that each component rkm,(t+1), t− n+ 2 ≤ m ≤ t is a
function of rkt , Zt+1 and γ
k
t .
1. For m = t, we have rkt,(t+1) := γ
k
t (·, Y kt−n+1). Since Y kt−n+1 is a part of Zt+1, rkt,(t+1)
is a function of γkt and Zt+1.
2. For m = t− n+ 2, t− n+ 3, . . . , t− 1,
rkm,t+1(·) := γkm(·, Y km−n+1:t+1−n, Ukm−n+1:t+1−n)
= γkm(·, Y kt−n+1, Ukt−n+1, Y km−n+1:t−n, Ukm−n+1:t−n)
= rkm,t(·, Y kt−n+1, Ukt−n+1) (B.19)
Thus, for m = t−n+ 2, t−n+ 3, . . . , t−1, rkm,t+1 is a function of rkm,t and Zt+1.
Part 2)





t ), that is, there exist functions Ht, for t = 1, 2, . . . , T , such that






From (3.25) of Proposition III.5, we have that










where the last equation uses (B.20). Thus, to prove this part of the proposition, only
need to prove (B.20). For that matter, we need the following lemma.
Lemma B.2. St := (Xt−1, P 1t , P
2







t ), that is, there exists a fixed deterministic function Dt such that
St := (Xt−1, P 1t , P
2
t )
= Dt(Xt−n, Vt−n+1:t−1,W 1:2t−n+1:t, r
1:2
t ) (B.22)
Proof. We first prove a slightly weaker result: for t− n+ 1 ≤ m ≤ t− 1, there exists
a deterministic function Dˆm,t such that
(Xt−n+1:m, Y 1:2t−n+1:m, U
1:2
t−n+1:m)
= Dˆm,t(Xt−n, Vt−n+1:m,W 1:2t−n+1:m, r
1:2
t−n+1:m,t) (B.23)
using induction. First consider m = t−n+1. For this case, the LHS of (B.23) equals
(Xt−n+1, Y 1:2t−n+1, U
1:2
t−n+1). For k = 1, 2,










Furthermore, by the system dynamics,
Xt−n+1 = ft(Xt−n, U1:2t−n+1, Vt−n+1)
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Thus (Xt−n+1, Y 1:2t−n+1, U
1:2





This proves (B.23) for m = t − n + 1. Now assume that (B.23) is true for some m,
t− n+ 1 ≤ m < t− 1. We show that this implies that (B.23) is also true for m+ 1.
For k = 1, 2,












Furthermore, by the system dynamics,

















Combining this with the induction hypothesis, we conclude that
(Xt−n+1:m+1, Y 1:2t−n+1:m+1, U
1:2
t−n+1:m+1) is a function of
(Xt−n,W 1:2t−n+1:m+1, Vt−n+1:m+1, r
1:2
t−n+1:m+1,t). Thus, by induction (B.23) is true for
t− n+ 1 ≤ m ≤ t− 1.
Now we use (B.23) to prove the lemma. For k = 1, 2








Combining this with (B.23) for m = t − 1 implies that there exists a deterministic
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function Dˆt such that
(Xt−n+1:t−1, Y 1:2t−n+1:t, U
1:2





This implies that there exists a function Dt such that Lemma B.2 is true.
Now consider
Πt(st) := Pψ(St = st|Ct, γ11:t−1, γ21:t−1)
=
∑
1st{Dt(xt−n, vt−n+1:t−1, w1:2t−n+1:t, r˜1:2t }
· P(xt−n, vt−n+1:t−1, w1:2t−n+1:t, r˜1:2t |Ct, γ1:21:t−1) (B.24)
where the summation is over all choices of (xt−n, vt−n+1:t−1, w1:2t−n+1:t, r˜
1:2
t ). The vec-
tors r1:2t are completely determined by Ct and γ
1:2
1:t−1; the noise random variables
vt−n+1:t−1, w1:2t−n+1:t are independent of the conditioning terms and Xt−n. Therefore,
we can write (B.24) as
∑
1st{Dt(xt−n, vt−n+1:t−1, w1:2t−n+1:t, r˜1t , r˜2t )}
· P(vt−n+1:t−1, w1:2t−n+1:t) · 1r˜1t ,r˜2t (r1t , r2t )
· P(xt−n|Ct, γ11:t−1, γ21:t−1) (B.25)
In the last term of (B.25), we dropped γ1:21:t−1 from the conditioning terms because
they are functions of Ct. The last term is therefore same as P(xt−n|Ct) = Θt. Thus,




t , thereby proving (B.20).
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Part 3)
Consider the LHS of (3.45)




1θt+1(Qt+1(θt, zt+1)) · 1r˜1t+1(Q1t+1(r˜1t , γ˜1t , zt+1))
· 1r˜2t+1(Q2t+1(r˜2t , γ˜2t , zt+1))
· P(Zt+1 = zt+1|ct, γ˜1:21:t , r˜11:t, r˜21:t) (B.26)
The last term of (B.26) can be written as
















1hˆt(st)(zt+1) ·Ht(θt, r˜1t , r˜2t )(st) (B.27)
Substituting (B.27) back in (B.26), we get





· 1r˜1t+1(Q1t+1(r˜1t , γ˜1t , zt+1))
· 1r˜2t+1(Q2t+1(r˜2t , γ˜2t , zt+1))
· 1hˆt(st)(zt+1) ·Ht(θt, r˜1t , r˜2t )(st)





Appendix for General Sequential Problem
Proof of Proposition IV.10
Fix a coordinator strategy ψ. Let 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. Consider a realization ct+1
of the common information Ct+1. Let (γ˜1:t) be the corresponding realization of par-
tial functions until time t. Assume that the realization (ct+1, pi1:t, γ˜1:t) has non-zero
probability. Then, the realization pit+1 of Πt+1 is given by
pit+1(q, u1, u2, . . . , ut)
= Pψ(Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut = ut|ct+1, γ˜1:t)
= Pψ(Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut = ut|ct, zt+1, γ˜1:t) (C.1)
=




Pψ(Q = q′, U1 = u′1, . . . , Ut = u′t, Zt+1 = zt+1|ct, γ˜1:t)
(C.2)
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where we used the fact that ct+1 consists of ct and zt+1 in (C.1) and Bayes’ rule in
(C.2). Focusing on the numerator in (C.2) gives
Pψ(Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut = ut, Zt+1 = zt+1|ct, γ˜1:t)
= P(Zt+1 = zt+1|Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut = ut)
· Pψ(Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut = ut|ct, γ˜1:t), (C.3)
where we used the fact that the random vector Zt+1 (being a part of It+1) is a known
measurable function of the primitive random variables and the decisions U1:t. The
above expression can be further written as
P(Zt+1 = zt+1|Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut = ut)
· P(Ut = ut|Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut−1 = ut−1, ct, γ˜1:t)
· Pψ(Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut−1 = ut−1|ct, γ˜1:t)
= P(Zt+1 = zt+1|Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut = ut)
· P(Ut = ut|Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut−1 = ut−1, γ˜t)
· Pψ(Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut−1 = ut−1|ct, γ˜1:t−1) (C.4)
where we used the fact that Ut = γ˜t(Pt) and Pt is a known measurable function of
the primitive random variables and the decisions U1:t−1 to simplify the second term
in (C.4). Also, we dropped γ˜t from the conditioning terms in the third term of (C.4)
since it is a fixed function of the remaining terms in the conditioning under the given
coordination strategy. Recognizing the last term in (C.4) to be pit(q, u1, . . . , ut), we
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get the following expression for the numerator of (C.2)
P(Zt+1 = zt+1|Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut = ut)
· P(Ut = ut|Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut−1 = ut−1, γ˜t)
· pit(q, u1, . . . , ut) (C.5)
Similar expressions hold for the denominator terms in (C.2). Thus, we get that
pit+1 = Ft+1(pit, γ˜t, zt+1)
where Ft+1(·) is given by (C.2), (C.3), and (C.5).
Finally, for piT+1 we have
piT+1(q, u1, u2, . . . , uT )
= Pψ(Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , UT = uT |cT , γ˜1:T )
= P(UT = uT |Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , UT−1 = uT−1, cT , γ˜1:T )
· Pψ(Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , UT−1 = uT−1|cT , γ˜1:T )
= P(UT = uT |Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , UT−1 = uT−1, γ˜T )
· Pψ(Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , UT−1 = uT−1|cT , γ˜1:T−1) (C.6)
where we used the fact that UT = γ˜T (PT ) and PT is a known measurable function of
the primitive random variables and the decisions U1:T−1 to simplify the second term
in (C.6). Also, we dropped γ˜T from the conditioning terms in the third term of (C.6)
since it is a fixed function of the remaining terms in the conditioning under the given
coordination strategy. Recognizing the last term in (C.6) to be piT (q, u1, . . . , uT−1),
170
we get
piT+1(q, u1, u2, . . . , uT )
P(UT = uT |Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , UT−1 = uT−1, γ˜T ) · piT (q, u1, . . . , uT−1)
(C.7)
Thus,
piT+1 = FT+1(piT , γ˜T )
Proof of Proposition IV.11
Fix a coordinator strategy ψ. Let 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. Consider a realization ct+1
of the common information Ct+1. Let γ˜1:t be the corresponding realization of par-
tial functions until time t. Assume that the realization (ct+1, pi1:t, γ˜1:t) has non-zero
probability. Consider,
Pψ(Πt+1 = pit+1|ct, pi1:t, γ˜1:t)




1pit+1(Ft+1(pit, γ˜t, zt+1))Pψ(Zt+1 = zt+1|ct, pi1:t, γ˜1:t) (C.8)
Focusing on the conditional probability of Zt+1 in the above summation, we have








P(Zt+1 = zt+1|Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut = ut)
· Pψ(Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut = ut|ct, pi1:t, γ˜1:t), (C.9)
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where we used the fact that the random vector Zt+1 (being a part of It+1) is a known
measurable function of the primitive random variables and the decisions U1:t. Each
term in the above summation can be further written as
P(Zt+1 = zt+1|Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut = ut)
· P(Ut = ut|Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut−1 = ut−1, γ˜t)
· Pψ(Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut−1 = ut−1|ct, γ˜1:t−1) (C.10)
where we used the fact that Ut = γ˜t(Pt) and Pt is a known measurable function of
the primitive random variables and the decisions U1:t−1 to simplify the second term in
(C.10). Also, we dropped γ˜t from the conditioning terms in the third term of (C.10)
since it is a fixed function of the remaining terms in the conditioning under the given
coordination strategy. Recognizing the last term in (C.10) to be pit(q, u1, . . . , ut−1)
gives the following simplification of (C.10)
P(Zt+1 = zt+1|Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut = ut)
· P(Ut = ut|Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut−1 = ut−1, γ˜t) · pit(q, u1, . . . , ut−1) (C.11)
Using expressions (C.9), (C.10) and (C.11) in (C.8), we get








P(Zt+1 = zt+1|Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut = ut)
· P(Ut = ut|Q = q, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, . . . , Ut−1 = ut−1, γ˜t) · pit(q, u1, . . . , ut−1) (C.12)
Among all the conditioning terms in the left hand side of equation (C.12), the right
hand side of equation (C.12) depends only on the realization pit and γ˜t. Also, it should
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be noted that none of the terms on the right hand side of (C.12) depend on ψ. Thus,
we can conclude that
Pψ(Πt+1 = pit+1|ct, pi1:t, γ˜1:t)
= P(Πt+1 = pit+1|pit, γ˜t). (C.13)
Similar arguments establish the Markovian property at time T + 1.
Finally, we note that the expected reward can be written as
E{R(Q,U1, U2, . . . , UT )} = E
[
E{R(Q,U1, U2, . . . , UT )|CT , γ1:T}
]
(C.14)
The inner expectation in (C.14) can be written as:
∑
q,u1,..uT




R(q, u1, u2, .., uT )ΠT+1(q, u1, u2, . . . , uT )
=: R˜(ΠT+1) (C.15)
Thus,
E{R(Q,U1, U2, . . . , UT )} = E{R˜(ΠT+1)}. (C.16)
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APPENDIX D
Appendix for Sequential Problems with State
Proof of Proposition V.3
Fix a coordinator strategy ψ. Let 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. Consider a realization ct+1
of the common information Ct+1. Let γ˜1:t be the corresponding realization of par-
tial functions until time t. Assume that the realization (ct+1, pi1:t, γ˜1:t) has non-zero
probability. Then, the realization pit+1 of Πt+1 is given by
pit+1(l, p)
= Pψ(Lt+1 = l, Pt+1 = p|ct+1, γ˜1:t)
= Pψ(Lt+1 = l, Pt+1 = p|ct, zt+1, γ˜1:t) (D.1)
=
Pψ(Lt+1 = l, Pt+1 = p, Zt+1 = zt+1|ct, γ˜1:t)∑
l′,p′ Pψ(Lt+1 = l′, Pt+1 = p′, Zt+1 = zt+1|ct, γ˜1:t)
(D.2)
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where we used the fact that ct+1 consists of ct and zt+1 in (D.1) and Bayes’ rule in
(D.2). Focusing on the numerator in (D.2) gives








Pψ(Lt+1 = l, Pt+1 = p, Zt+1 = zt+1|Lt = l′, Pt = p′, Ut = u, ct, γ˜1:t)




Pψ(Lt+1 = l, Pt+1 = p, Zt+1 = zt+1|Lt = l′, Pt = p′, Ut = u)
× Pψ(Lt = l′, Pt = p′, Ut = Ut|ct, γ˜1:t) (D.3)
where we used Condition 1 of the definition of state sufficient for input output map
in the first term of equation (D.3). Since the conditioning terms include Lt, Pt, Ut,
Condition 1 allows us to remove the remaining terms that are functions of Q1:t, U1:t.
The above expression can be further written as
∑
l′,p′,u
Pψ(Lt+1 = l, Pt+1 = p, Zt+1 = zt+1|Lt = l′, Pt = p′, Ut = u)




Pψ(Lt+1 = l, Pt+1 = p, Zt+1 = zt+1|Lt = l′, Pt = p′, Ut = u)
× 1u{γ˜t(p′)}Pψ(Lt = l′, Pt = p′|ct, γ˜1:t−1) (D.5)
where we used the fact that Ut = γ˜t(Pt) in (D.4). Also, we dropped γ˜t from the con-
ditioning terms in the third term of (D.5) since it is a fixed function of the remaining
terms in the conditioning under the given coordination strategy. Recognizing the last
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term in (D.5) to be pit(l
′, p′), we get the following expression for numerator in (D.2):
∑
l′,p′,u
Pψ(Lt+1 = l, Pt+1 = p, Zt+1 = zt+1|Lt = l′, Pt = p′, Ut = u)
× 1u{γ˜t(p′)}pi(l′p′) (D.6)
Similar expressions hold for the denominator terms in (D.2). Thus, we get that
pit+1 = Ft+1(pit, γ˜t, zt+1)
where Ft+1(·) is given by (D.2), (D.3), and (D.6).
Proof of Proposition V.4
Fix a coordinator strategy ψ. Let 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. Consider a realization ct+1
of the common information Ct+1. Let γ˜1:t be the corresponding realization of par-
tial functions until time t. Assume that the realization (ct+1, pi1:t, γ˜1:t) has non-zero
probability. Consider,
Pψ(Πt+1 = pit+1|ct, pi1:t, γ˜1:t)




1pit+1(Ft+1(pit, γ˜t, zt+1))Pψ(Zt+1 = zt+1|ct, pi1:t, γ˜1:t) (D.7)
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Focusing on the conditional probability of Zt+1 in the above summation, we have




Pψ(Zt+1 = zt+1|Lt = lt, Pt = pt, ct, pi1:t, γ˜1:t)




Pψ(Zt+1 = zt+1|Lt = lt, Pt = pt, ct, pi1:t, γ˜1:t)
× pit(lt, pt) (D.8)
where we used the definition of pit in (D.8). Since Ut = γt(Pt), we can add Ut in the
list of conditioning terms in (D.8) to get
∑
lt,pt
Pψ(Zt+1 = zt+1|Lt = lt, Pt = pt, ct, pi1:t, γ˜1:t, Ut = γ˜t(pt))pit(lt, pt) (D.9)
A direct consequence of Condition 1 is that
Pψ(Zt+1|Q1:t, U1:t) = P(Zt+1|St, Ut) (D.10)
Using equation (D.10) in (D.9), we get
∑
lt,pt
P(Zt+1 = zt+1|Lt = lt, Pt = pt, Ut = γ˜t(pt))pit(lt, pt) (D.11)
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Since the conditioning terms in (D.9) include Lt, Pt, Ut, (D.10) allowed us to remove
the remaining terms that are functions of Q1:t, U1:t. Using (D.11) in (D.7), we get








P(Zt+1 = zt+1|Lt = lt, Pt = pt, Ut = γ˜t(pt))pit(lt, pt) (D.12)
Among all the conditioning terms in the left hand side of equation (D.12), the right
hand side of equation (D.12) depends only on the realization pit and γ˜t. Also, it should
be noted that none of the terms on the right hand side of (D.12) depend on ψ. Thus,
we conclude that
Pψ(Πt+1 = pit+1|ct, pi1:t, γ˜1:t)
= P(Πt+1 = pit+1|pit, γ˜t). (D.13)
Finally, we note that the expected reward at time t can be written as
E{Rt(St, Ut)} = E{Rt(Lt, Pt, Ut)} = E{Rt(Lt, Pt, γt(Pt))} (D.14)
= E[E{Rt(Lt, Pt, γt(Pt))|Ct, γ1:t}] (D.15)
The inner expectation in (D.15) can be written as:
∑
l,p




Rt(l, p, γt(p))Πt(l, p)
=: R˜t(Πt, γt) (D.16)
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